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I. INTRODUCION
The year 19991 saw a number of changes and developments in Florida
professional responsibility law. This article surveys these developments by
reviewing: 1) relevant reported cases; 2) ethics opinions; 3) rules changes;
2
and 4) disciplinary actions affecting lawyers and the practice of law in the
Sunshine State. These authorities are examined in the context of the various
relationships upon which a lawyer's professional life is built and within
which the lawyer typically operates.
Developments relating to the relationship between lawyer and client are
collected in Part II. A lawyer's relationship with judges and the judicial
system is discussed in Part lT. Part IV addresses the lawyer's relationship
and interaction with third parties, such as witnesses and other attorneys.
Finally, Part V looks at the lawyer's relationship with the lawyer disciplinary
* Associate Dean of Information Resources and Technology and Associate Professor
of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida. B.S., 1977, Florida State
University; J.D., 1984, University of Texas; M.L.S., 1996, Florida State University.
** Florida Bar Ethics Director, Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., 1987, University of Florida;
J.D., 1990, University of Florida.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July 15,
1998 through June 30, 1999.
2. The rules of primary application in the area of professional responsibility are the
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC'), which are found in Chapter 4 of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
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system operated by the Florida Bar3 under the authorization and control of
the Supreme Court of Florida.4
II. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS
Perhaps the lawyer's most fundamental relationships are created and
maintained with the clients that he or she serves. Within this relationship,
ethical issues may arise relating to creation of the relationship, decision-
making authority of lawyer and client, communication with clients lawyer-
client confidentiality, conflicts of interest, fiduciary obligations, competence,
legal fees, and termination of the lawyer-client relationship.
In Keepsake, Inc. v. P.S.L. Industries, Inc.,5 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida noted that the test in Florida for
determining whether a lawyer-client relationship exists "hinges upon the
client's reasonable subjective belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that
capacity with the intention of seeking professional legal advice."6 Keepsake
and P.S.I. entered an exclusive distributorship agreement regarding a
disposable camera that used technology developed by Keepsake.7 While
continuing to represent Keepsake in various matters, Keepsake's law firm
assisted P.S.I. in seeking intellectual property protection and also
represented P.S.I. in state court litigation relating to this technology.8 The
law firm's fee agreement with P.S.I. contained a conflict of interest
provision providing that circumstances could arise that would require the
firm to withdraw from the reresentation of both clients.9 The state court
litigation ended in late 1997. 
r  t
Keepsake and P.S.I. subsequently had a falling out, resulting in the law
firm filing suit against P.S.I. on Keepsake's behalf." P.S.I. moved to dis-
3. The Florida Bar is an official agency of the Supreme Court of Florida. In order to be
licensed to practice law in Florida, a lawyer must be a member of The Florida Bar. See RPC Rule
1-3.1; Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
4. The court has the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the
practice of law and the discipline of persons [so] admitted." FLA. CoNsT. of 1968, art V, §15
(1972).
5. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
6. Id. at 1036 (citing The Florida Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1996)); see
also Blackhawk Tenn., Ltd. v. Waltemyer, 900 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Fla. 1995)(establishing test
for determining existence of a lawyer-client relationship); Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co. v. National
Presto Indus., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 57 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Dean v. Dean, 607 So. 2d 494 (Fla 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 611 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
7. Keepsake, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
[Vol. 24:199
Chinaris / Tarbert
qualify the law firm, and Keepsake's response surprisingly admitted that the
firm had "performed legal services" for P.S.L but refused to admit that this
performance had resulted in the formation of an attorney-client rela-
tionship. The court rejected this unusual position out of hand, ultimately
disqualifying the law firm.
13
Even with an understanding of the legal test for the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship, application of that test is not always easy.14 The
court recognized this in Boca Investors Group, Inc. v. Potash,15 noting that,
at least in the disqualification context,1 6 there is a distinction between an
initial consultation regarding counsel's availability (characterized by the
court as a "job interview"), and a lawyer-client discussion that included
disclosure of confidential information.rs The latter creation of a lawyer-
client relationship, would require disqualification, while the former would
not.
19
Once a lawyer-client relationship has been established, communication
between the two parties is an essential ingredient for successful teamwork.
Failure to communicate effectively, or the failure to document such com-
munications, can create ethical problems for the lawyer. The lawyer in The
Florida Bar v. Frederickss suffered disciplinary consequences when a series
12. Keepsake, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
13. Id. at 1037 n.3. In a footnote, the court observed that the law firm's "implicit
distinction between 'little' and 'big' clients is without any legal or ethical support." Id.
Regarding other lawyers or law firms who have encountered legal or disciplinary difficulties as a
result of improperly attempting to distinguish between "real" clients and "other" clients, see, e.g.,
The Florida Bar v. Jasperson, 625 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1993) (lawyer who filed bankruptcy petition
for client and client's spouse, whom lawyer never met or advised, disciplined for violating rules
requiring communication with and effective representation of spouse/client); Smith v. Perry, 635
So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (lawyer who represented husband in personal injury
case and filed consortium claim for wife, whom lawyer had not met nor entered into employment
agreement with, was sued by wife for malpractice as result of lawyer's role in husband receiving
lion's share of settlement proceeds). See also Brennan v. Independence Blue Cross, 949 F. Supp.
305 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (lawyer who represented insured in medical malpractice case and insurer on
related subrogation claim disqualified from representing insured against insurer in later dispute
over future medical benefits; subrogation representation was more than mere courtesy and
established lawyer-client relationship with insured).
14. This is an area that presents potential pitfalls for unwary lawyers. See, e.g., Garner v.
Somberg, 672 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996), discussed in Timothy P. Chinaris,
Professional Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NOVA L. REV. 231, 235 (1996)
[hereinafter "Chinaris"].
15. 728 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
16. See infra part III regarding disqualification cases.
17. Boca Investors Group, Inc., 728 So. 2d at 825.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 731 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1999).
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of regresentations went awry and the client filed a complaint with the Florida
Bar. The client's and the lawyer's recollections of the operative events
were quite discrepant, but neither could back up his version with any written
documentation. 22 The lawyer was found guilty of violating RPC 4-1.4,
23
RPC 4-1.3 (requiring diligent representation), and RPC 4-8.4(c) (prohibiting
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).24  The
lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for six months for violating
RPC 4-1.4, which requires that a lawyer keep a client informed about the
status of the case.
The allocation of decision-making responsibility between a client and a
lawyer within their professional relationship is also an ethical matter. RPC
4-1.2 26 contains a framework for considering this issue. The question was
discussed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in affirming a trial court's
denial of a motion for postconviction relief based on alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel in a criminal representation. Demurjian v. State28
concerned a petitioner who had been charged with first degree murder.29 He
contended that "he killed the victim in self-defense."'  At his trial,
instructions on lesser included offenses were given to the jury, but during the
21. Id. at 1250.
22. Id.
23. RPC 4-1.4, "COMMUNICATION" provides:
(a) Informing Client of Status of Representation. A lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information.
(b) Duty to Explain Matters to Client. A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
Id.
24. Federicks, 731 So. 2d at 1254.
25. RPC 4-1.4 (1993).
26. Subdivision (a) of Rule 4-1.2 of the RPC, "SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION,"
provides:
Lawyer to Abide by Client's Decisions. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to subdivisions
(c), (d), and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to
make or accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer,
as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client
will testify.
Id.
27. Demurjian v. State, 727 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 325.
30. Id.
[Vol. 24:199202
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closing argument, petitioner's counsel used what is called an "all or nothing"
argument: the lawyer told the jury that his client wanted them to ignore the
lesser included offenses and to either convict him of first degree murder or
find him not guilty.3x He was convicted.32 In his post-conviction relief
motion, the petitioner alleged that he had never consented to the "'all or
nothing"' closing argument.33 The appellate court noted that this form of
litigation strategy was not uncommon in criminal defense cases, and stated
that "there is no requirement for counsel to obtain a client's consent for trial
strategy decisions."4 Whether the client consented to the "all or nothing"
approach was irrelevant, and the court concluded that counsel's performance
was not constitutionally deficient.35
A regularly recurring question facing many practitioners is the extent of
the duty to provide clients, or former clients, with copies of file material
generated during the lawyer-client relationship.36 This is a mixed issue of37
ethics and law, as indicated in RPC 4-1.16. This rule requires that, upon
the termination of employment, a lawyer turn over to the client "papers and
property to which the client is entitled" but permits the lawyer to "retain
papers and other property relating to or belonpng to the client to the extent
permitted by law. 38 In Donahue v. Vaughn, a former client filed a writ of
mandamus to compel his former lawyer to provide to him, free of charge,
"all records" in his case.40 The court denied the writ for several reasons, first
among them being the fact that
31. Id. at 326.
32. Demurfian, 727 So. 2d at 325.
33. Id. at 326.
34. Id. at 327.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Timothy P. Chinaris & Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Professional
Responsibility: 1998 Survey of Florida Law, 23 NOVA L. REV. 161, 169 (1998) [hereinafter
"Chinaris & Tarbert].
37. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING
REPRESENTATION," provides:
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to
protect a client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of
fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers and other property
relating to or belonging to the client to the extent permitted by law.
Id.
38. Id
39. 721 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
40. Id. at 356.
1999]
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there is no duty upon a private attorney to give any of his
files to a client, save documents which are solely those of
the client and held by the lawyer. Pleadings, investigative
reports, subpoena copies, reports and other case preparation
documents are property of the lawyer. He is not required to
give that material to the client or make copies free of
charge.4'
Confidentiality is an essential part of the lawyer-client relationship.
This is recognized in both legal ethics42 and law. The ethical duty of
confidentiality requires that, with certain limited exceptions, a lawyer refrain
from voluntarily revealing any "information relating to representation" of a
client."4 This duty continues even after the lawyer-client relationship has
ended.45 In The Florida Bar v. Carricarte,46 a lawyer was disciplined for
41. ld. at 357.
42. RPC 4-1.6, "CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION," provides:
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client except as stated in sub-
divisions (1), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the
client.
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client
specifically requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) Exhaustion of Appellate Remedies. When required by a tribunal to
reveal such information, a lawyer may first exhaust all appellate remedies.
(e) Limitation on Amount of Disclosure. When disclosure is mandated or
permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than is required to
meet the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule.
Id.
43. In Florida the law of client-lawyer privilege is codified in FLA STAT. § 90.502
(1999).
44. RPC 4-1.6(a), supra note 42.
45. RPC 4-1.6, comment (1993).
[V/ol. 24:199
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failing to honor this obligation.47 The lawyer had been house counsel for
corporations owned by members of his family.48 Following his termination
as counsel, the lawyer misappropriated trade secrets and disclosed them to
third parties.49 He also threatened to reveal additional confidential informa-
tion unless his former client authorized him to receive $25 000 "severance
pay" from funds being held in the lawyer's trust account.:° The Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the finding of the referee5' that the lawyer had
violated the basic duty of confidentiality expressed in RPC 4-1.6(a)5 2 and
had violated RPC 4-1.6(e)53 by revealing more confidential information than
was reasonably necessary at a hearing held as part of a suit that the former
client filed against the lawyer for disclosing the trade secrets.5
4
Two legal malpractice cases reflected the respect that courts accord the
principle of lawyer-client confidentiality and the cautious approach courts
often take when disclosure of confidential information is sought. Coyne v.
Schwartz, Gold, Cohen, Zakarin & Kotler, P.A.55 arose from an erroneous
title certification that affected a real estate development project.56 A law
firm's former clients sued the firm, alleging that they had suffered damages
as a result of the firm's negligence relating to the title certification. 7 The
clients had been sued by third parties when they began construction on the
project.58 The clients hired a second law firm to defend them in that suit,
which was ultimately settled.5 9 The clients, represented by the second law
46. 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999).
47. Id. at 976.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 977.
50. Id.
51. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d at 977-78. The Supreme Court of Florida appoints a county
or circuit judge to preside as "referee" over the trial of disciplinary cases. RULEs REGULATING
THEFLORIDA BAR 3-7.6(a) (1993).
52. See supra note 42.
53. Id
54. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d at 978. Even when disclosure of otherwise confidential
information is authorized by one of the exceptions contained in RPC 4-1.6, the rule permits such
disclosure only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary." RPC 4-1.6(b)-(c). The
limited scope of permissible disclosure is emphasized by RPC 4-1.6(e), which specifies that "the
lawyer shall disclose no more information than is required to meet the requirements or
accomplish the purposes of this rule." RPC 4-1.6(e)(1993). In Carricarte, the lawyer accused the
family corporation and their principals of crimes including tax evasion, insurance fraud, and
conspiracy. 733 So. 2d at 977.
55. 715 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
56. Id. at 1022.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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firm, then brought the malpractice action against the first law firm.6o The
first firm alleged negligence on the part of the second firm and sought pro-
duction of all correspondence between the clients and the second firm, con-
cerning the property.6 1 The trial court ordered production. The Fourth
Dis-trict Court of Appeal reversed the order, concluding that the information• 63 ttecet a
was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The fact that the clients had
hired a second law firm to represent them in connection with a matter in
which they had been represented by the first firm did not constitute a waiver
of the privilege as to communications between the clients and the second
firm.64 The possible relevance of the documents sought was not sufficient to
override the privilege.65
In Volpe v. Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., 6 insureds were defended
under a reservation of rights by a law firm hired by the insurance company.67
68The insureds also hired their personal counsel. The insureds later brought
a malpractice suit against the law firm for failing to give certain advice.69 In
defense, the law firm alleged that actions of their former client's personal
counsel had contributed to the clients' damages. 70 The law firm sought to
depose the personal counsel to ascertain if the advice in question had been
given by1 personal counsel, but the insureds asserted attorney-client
privilege. The trial court's order compelling production of this information
72was reversed on appeal.
The appellate court pointed out that there was no evidence that the
insureds had intended to share all communications between them and their
personal counsel with the law firm hired by the insurance company."
Although the law firm and the personal counsel had represented the same
clients,
60. Coyne, 715 So. 2d at 1021.
61. Id. at 1022.
62. Id. at 1021.
63. Id. at 1023.
64. Id. at 1022.
65. Coyne, 715 So. 2d at 1023. See also Shafnaker v. Clayton, 680 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The court in Coyne relied upon Shafnaker, wherein the First District
Court of Appeal also applied a narrow construction of the attorney-client privilege in a similar
situation. Id. at 1111.
66. 720 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
67. Id. at 538.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 539.
72. Id. at 540.
73. Id. at 539.
206 [Vol. 24:199
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it does not follow that the client cannot assert the attorney-
client privilege with respect to matters which may have been
discussed with one attorney but not with another. Parti-
cularly in an insurance representation context, the interest of
the insured in further pro-tecting his or her own position
may compel the insured to retain and communicate with a
personal attorney. The client has every right to assume that
the attorney will keep those communications confidential.74
The appellate court narrowly construed the lawyer-client dispute
exception to the privilege,75 considering it as not applicable under the facts
presented.76 The court also rejected the argument that the "joint defense"
exception77 to waiver of the privilege, applied to permit the law firm's access
to the communications between the clients and their personal counsel.78
Concluding that the joint defense doctrine was inapplicable, the court stated
that it "does not give a coparty the right to obtain disclosure of all
communications shared by a coparty with that party's own attorney."
79
Various types of conflicts of interest can arise in the lawyer-client
relationship. Several cases addressed one of the most common sources of
conflict questions, which is a lawyer's representation of a current client in a
matter that is adverse to the interest of one of the lawyer's former clients.
RPC 4-1.980 is the primary rule governing former client conflicts. It can be
difficult to precisely define and apply the operative terms of this rule. For
example, the rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a current client whose
interests are "materially adverse" to the interests of the lawyer's former
client in a "matter" that is the "same" as or "substantially related" to the
74. L at 539 (emphasis added).
75. See F-A STAT. § 90.502(4)(c) (1999).
76. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 539-40.
77. See Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987). See generally, Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine from the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TVx. L. REv. 1273 (1990).
78. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 539.
79. Id.
80. RPC 4-1.9, "CONFLICTS OF INTEREST; FORMER CLIENT," provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
1999]
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matter in which the lawyer represented the former client, unless the former
client "consents after consultation."8' Similarly, the rule also precludes the
lawyer from using "information relating to the representation '' 2 of the for-
mer client to the former client's disadvantage, unless one of the exceptions
to the confidentiality rule applies or the information is "generally known."
83
Two of these issues, the question of "consent after consultation" to a
former client conflict and the question of whether one matter is
"substantially related" to another, were addressed in The Florida Bar v.
Dunagan.84 In Dunagan, a lawyer represented a husband and wife in buying
a business and in litigation relating to that business.85 A year or two later,
the lawyer represented the husband against the wife in a divorce proceeding
in which ownership of the business was an issue.86 The wife consulted with
her new lawyer about the fact that her former lawyer now opposed
her.87 Her new lawyer told her that "there were better attorneys to be up
against" but never clearly advised her of her rights or that she might be
88prejudiced by the prior representation. The wife subsequently sued her
former lawyer for malpractice.8 9 A Florida Bar disciplinary case was also
instituted against the former lawyer.9° Charges against him included
violating RPC 4-1.9 by opposing his former client, the wife, in the same or a
substantially related matter without her consent after consultation. 9'
Regarding the issue of "consent after consultation," the lawyer asserted
that the wife's failure to object to his representation of the husband was
tantamount to the required consent.92 The court rejected this defense.93 The
lawyer had never consulted with the wife about the conflict question.
94
Furthermore, the court stated that the failure of the wife and her new lawyer
"to affirmatively object cannot be construed as 'consent after consultation'
as required by the rules." 95 The court went on to explain that the burden of
raising the conflict issue and securing consent after consultation belonged to
81. RPC 4-1.9(a), supra note 80.
82. See RPC 4-1.6(a), supra note 42 and accompanying text.
83. RPC 4-1.9(b), supra note 80.
84. 731 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1999).
85. Id. at 1238.
86. Id. at 1239.
87. Id. at 1241.
88. Id.
89. Dunagan, 731 So. 2d at 1239.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1240.
93. Id. at 1241.
94. Dunagan, 731 So. 2d at 1241.
95. Id.
208 [Vol. 24:199
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the lawyer and was "not the responsibility of the client or the client's new
attorney.,
96
The court also rejected the lawyer's contention that the divorce matter
in which he opposed the wife was not "substantially related" to the matters
in which he previously represented her.97 Noting that "[w]hether two legal
matters are substantially related depends upon the specific facts of each
particular situation or transaction[,]" the court concluded that there was a
substantial relationship between the matters. The ownership of the
business was clearly a material issue in the divorce case.
99
Keepsake, Inc. v. P.S.I. Industries, Inc.'0 also dealt with application of
the "substantially related" portion of RPC 4-1.9. 1 1 Keepsake's law firm had
also represented P.S.I. in connection with securing trademark and
international patent protection for a product that was the subject of a
distributorship agreement between P.S.I. and Keepsake.' The firm also
represented P.S.I. in state court litigation concerning the product and its
distribution. 3 The law firm referred to its representations of Keepsake and
P.S.I. as a "joint representation."'1 4  Subsequently the firm represented
Keepsake in suing P.S.I. for alleged breach of the distributorship
agreement. 1°5 In granting P.S.I.'s motion to disqualify the law firm from that
case, the trial court concluded that the pending suit was substantially related
to the law firm's prior representation of P.S.1.o6 The court noted that P.S.I.
had retained the law firm to help it perform obligations that it had under the
distributorship agreement, and that these actions were undertaken to protect
and advance P.S..'s interests.1°7 "Having undertaken to protect and advance
PSI's business interest, [the law firm] can not now, without consent,
represent an adverse party [Keepsake] in litigation regarding the extent of
and limitations on those interests."''1
8
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Freund v. Butterworth,10 9
held, in a habeas corpus case based on alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel, that the issue of whether a lawyer's prior representation is
96. ML
97. Id. at 1239.
98. M at 1240.
99. Dunagan, 731 So. 2d at 1240.
100. 33 F Supp. 2d 1033 (M.D. Fa. 1999).
101. Id. at 1035.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Keepsake, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
106. Id. at 1036.
107. Id. at 1037.
108. Id.
109. 165 F.3d 839 (1lth Cir. 1999).
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substantially related to a later representation 'is a mixed question of law
and fact.' '' . In this case, the court also addressed the applicability of the
provision in RPC 4-1.9(b)... that permits a lawyer to use otherwise
confidential information about a former client to the disadvantage of that
former client in a later, unrelated matter, even without the consent of the
former client 2 This provision allows such use of information as permitted
by RPC 4-1.6113 or when the information has become "generally known."'
1 4
The Eleventh Circuit appeared to construe this exception broadly under
the facts before it.15 The petitioner charged that his law firm at trial labored
under a conflict because the law firm had also represented a key potential
adverse witness in numerous prior, unrelated matters. 116  Petitioner
contended that the law firm's cross-examination of that witness would be
impeded by the ethical obligation in RPC 4-1.9(b), not to use confidential
information to the disadvantage of the witness (the former client).'1 7 The
court rejected the argument that RPC 4-1.9(b) was implicated, pointing out
that the "only arguably relevant information that the law firm knew" about
the former client was the existence of certain previous arrests and charges
against him.1 s  Relying on the "generally known" exception in RPC 4-1.9(b), the court stated that "[u]nder the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar,
110. Id. at 861.
111. See supra note 80, and accompanying text.
112. Freund, 165 F.3d at 865.
113. See supra note 42, and accompanying text.
114. Freund, 165 F.3d at 865.
115. Id. Other authorities seem to have taken a less expansive view of the "generally
known" exception. See Russakoff v. Department of Ins., 724 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998); King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to equate "public
record" with "generally known" provision of Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.9(b)).
See also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 861-62 (W.Va. 1995) ("ethical
duty of confidentiality is not nullified by the fact that the information is part of a public record").
When applying the "generally known" exception in cases where the information in question is
a matter of public record, the focus of the inquiry should be on whether, but for the lawyer's
prior representation of that client, the lawyer would have known of the existence and location
of that information. A lawyer who, as in Freund, would be using public record information
that is available and known to any reasonably competent lawyer in that position should fall
within the scope of the "generally known" exception in RPC 4-1.9(b). On the other hand,
some bit of relevant but obscure information buried deep within the "public records" and not
known to anyone except the client's lawyer (or former lawyer) should not be considered
"generally known" for purposes of RPC 4-1.9(b).
116. Freund, 165 F.3d at 862.
117. Id. at 865.
118. Id. at 864. The court went on to note that the prosecutor's decision not to call the
law firm's former client to testify removed the possibility that the firm would cross-examine him
using protected confidential information. Id. at 865.
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the law firm's knowledge of those charges cannot be the basis of a conflict
of interest."1 19
Conflict of interest problems can also arise when a lawyer's personal
interest conflicts or potentially conflicts with the interests of a client.120 A
relatively unusual personal interest conflict was alleged in Herring v.
State.121 In a motion for post-conviction relief, a petitioner alleged that he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel because one of the assistant
public defenders who represented him at trial, Howard Pearl, had a conflict
of interest because Pearl was a special deputy sheriff.1 2 Attorney Pearl had
applied to become a special deputy sheriff in order to be authorized to carry
a concealed firearm for protective purposes. 123 The issue before the court
was whether the lawyer had an actual conflict of interest that resulted in the
rendition of ineffective assistance.12 The court concluded that "[t]he record
119. Il at864.
120. RPC 4-1.7, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; GENERAL RULE," provides:
(a) Representing Adverse Interests. A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests of
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the lawyer's responsibilities to and relationship with the other client;
and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment. A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's exercise of independent
professional judgment in the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or
by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(c) Explanation to Clients. When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
(d) Lawyers Related by Blood or Marriage. A lawyer related to another
lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse shall not represent a client in a
representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after
consultation regarding the relationship.
Id.
121. 730 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1998).
122. Id. at 1266.
123. Id at 1267.
124. Id. at 1265.
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reveals no evidence suggesting that [petitioner]'s interests were impaired or
compromised as a result of Pearl's special deputy status.
' '125
A more conventional personal interest conflict was presented in The
Florida Bar v. Cox. 26 A lawyer co-owned a business with one of his clients,
and also was the business's general counsel.' 27 The lawyer represented
another client in connection with organizing a line of credit for this
business. 12 The lawyer did not disclose to the other client his interest in the
business, his position as its general counsel, or the fact that his co-owner was
also one of his clients.129 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the finding
that the lawyer was guilty of violating both RPC 4-1.7b), 13  which
proscribes personal interest conflicts, and RPC 4-1.8(a), governing
business transactions with clients. 32 The court observed that the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in the other client's representation was
limited by his own interests and by the resgonsibilities that he owed to the
client who co-owned the business with him.
125. Id. at 1268. Attorney Pearl's status as a special deputy sheriff has generated a
number of conflict claims in post-conviction litigation. See, e.g., Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.
2d 1009 (Fla. 1999); Stano v. State, 708 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1998); Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d
688 (Fla. 1998); Swafford v. State, 636 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1994); Henderson v. Singletary, 617
So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1993); Jones v. State, 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992); Wright v. State, 581 So. 2d
882 (Fla. 1991); Quince v. State, 732 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990); Harich v. State, 573 So. 2d 303
(Fla. 1990).
126. 718 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1998).
127. Id. at 790.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Supra note 120.
131. Subdivision (a) of Rule 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTERESTS; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client.
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or
expenses, unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id.
132. For these and a number of other violations, the lawyer was disbarred. Cox, 718 So.
2d at 794.
133. Id. at 792.
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Another variety of personal interest conflict was seen in The Florida
Bar v. Vining134 The lawyer purported to represent his client in one matter
while, at the same time, the lawyer was being sued by, and counterclaiming
against, the same client in another matter.135- The client did not consent to
this conflict.136  The lawyer was disciplined for, among other things,
violating RPC 4-1.7(b).
137
A lawyer's relationship with clients also implicates duties that include,
but can extend beyond, the standards set by the ethics rules. These are duties
imposed upon lawyers as a matter of law. They include fiduciary responsi-
bilities and duties of competent representation. Typically these legal duties
are articulated and enforced in the context of legal malpractice cases. Some
of the developments in the area of legal malpractice law are worthy of
special notice. 38
The close, personal, confidential nature of the lawyer-client relationship
has long been recognized by Florida courts in the context of actions for legal
malpractice. For example, lawyers' liability for malpractice ordinarily runs
only to persons who have privity of contract with the lawyer.139 The only
exception to the rule of privity is in a situation where the known intent of the
client was for the lawyer's services to benefit a third party.1'4 For this
reason, malpractice claims are not assignable.141 In National Union Fire
Insurance Co. v. Salter, 42 the court relied on these principles in concluding
that an insurance company that paid its insured's losses under the insurance
policy was not subrograted to the insured's right to recover on an alleged
legal malpractice claim against the insured's attorneys, whose negligence
allegedly caused the loss.1
As noted, a lawyer's duty to competently represent a client is an
intensely personal one. Even if multiple lawyers represent a client, each
lawyer must take care to see that proper representation is being provided. In
134. 721 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1998).
135. Id. at 1166.
136. Id. Quite to the contrary; during the course of the representation the client in fact,
discharged the lawyer. Id.
137. I& at 1170.
138. This article does not attempt to undertake a comprehensive survey of developments
in the area of legal malpractice. Rather, significant developments most directly relating to
lawyers' professional responsibility are reviewed.
139. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d
1378 (Fla. 1998); Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberson Investments, N.V., 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla.
1987).
140. Angel, 512 So. 2d at 194.
141. See, e.g., Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, 701 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1997) (discussed in
Chinaris & Tarbert, supra note 36, at 164-67).
142. 717 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
143. Id. at 143.
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Spaziano v. Price,144 a person was injured during a scuba diving trip to the
Bahamas. Upon returning to his home in New Jersey, this person hired a
Philadelphia law firm to represent him in this matter. 45 The Philadelphia
law firm determined that the suit should be brought in Florida, and contacted
Florida lawyer Price to assist.146 The Philadelphia law firm was of the
opinion that the Florida four year statute of limitation on negligence actions
applied.1 47 This opinion turned out to be incorrect.148 In the ensuing legal
malpractice action brought by the client against Price, Price defended by
asserting that he was entitled to rely on the Philadelphia firm's opinion
concerning the limitations period. 149 Concluding that this contention was
"without merit," the appellate court observed that the Florida lawyer and his
firm were "required to bring to that representation the requisite knowledge
and skill to determine the appropriate statute of limitations."'' 50 The lawyer's
reliance on the Philadelphia firm's opinion did not relieve him of the duty
that he owed to the client.
Another, more conventional, defense raised by lawyers who are accused
of malpractice is that of judgmental immunity. The lawyer makes many
judgments in the course of the lawyer-client relationship. In making these
judgments, the lawyer has a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill.151
Nevertheless, the law recognizes that a lawyer's good faith decision, made
after diligent inquiry, regarding a fairly debatable or unsettled point of law is
not actionable as a breach of this duty, even if the lawyer's decision later
turns out to be incorrect.152 In DeBiasi v. Snaith,153 a client's chance to have
an unfavorable decision of an appellate court reviewed was lost when his
motion to certify a question was denied as untimely filed. 154 The client then
sued his lawyer for alleged malpractice.155  The lawyer defended on the
ground of judgmental immunity, arguing that the language of the procedural
rule in question 56 was ambiguous and thus provided him with the protection
144. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 19,1999).
145. Id. at D1224.
146. Id.
147. Id. at D1225.
148. Id.
149. Spaziano, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1225.
150. Id.
151. RPC 4-1.1, "COMPETENCE" provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Id.
152. See Crosby v. Jones, 705 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 1998), and cases cited therein.
153. 732 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id.
156. At issue was FLA. R. APP. PRoc. 9.330.
[Vol. 24:199
Chinaris / Tarbert
of the judgment immunity doctrine. 157 Summary judgment was granted in
the lawyer's favor.15 8  The appellate court reversed.15 9  The lawyer's
contention that the procedural rule was ambiguous was not sufficient to
warrant the determination that, as a matter of law, his actions were clothed
with judgmental immunity. 16° No showing of diligent inquiry was made on
his part, and he apparently cited no law authorizing his interpretation of the
rule.61 Thus, on remand the lawyer would have to prove "the factual issue
of his good faith and diligent inquiry.
' 16 2
A novel but unsuccessful defense to a malpractice claim was raised by
the lawyer in Tarleton v. Arnstein & Lehr.16 A law firm, was sued by its
former client for alleged malpractice arising from the representation of her in
a dissolution of marriage action.'6 After trial, the jury entered a verdict
finding that the law firm was negligent in its representation and that its
negligence was responsible for seventy-five percent of the wife's claimed
damages; however, the jury found the wife to be comparatively negligent for
twenty-five percent of her damages.165 The court granted the firm's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied the former client's
motion for entry of judgment. [6 The former client appealed, urging that the
trial court erred in denying her motion.167 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal made it clear that the defense of the former client's comparative
negligence was not available to the law firmm.' 68 "A client cannot be found to
be comparatively negligent for relying on an attorney's erroneous legal
advice or for failing to correct errors of the attorney which involve the
exercise of professional expertise."1 69 The relative sophistication of the
client "does not impose upon her the burden to second guess her attorney's
advice or hire a second attorney to see if such advice was proper."
1 70
A final consideration for lawyers in this area is the question of when the
statute of limitations for an alleged act of malpractice accrues. The Supreme
Court of Florida announced what it termed a "bright-line rule" in Silvestrone
157. Debiasi, 732 So. 2d at 15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 16.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. at 16.
162. DeBiasi, 732 So. 2d at 16.
163. 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
164. Id. at 326.
165. Id. at 328.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Tarelton, 719 So. 2d at 328.
169. Id. at331.
170. l
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v. Edell. 71 The court held that, in cases that proceed to judgment, Florida's
two-year limitations period begins to run when the final judgment becomes
final. 72 To illustrate, the court noted that "a judgment becomes final either
upon the expiration of the time for filing an appeal or postjudgment motions,
or, if an appeal is taken, upon the appeal being affirmed and either the
expiration of the time for filing motions for rehearing or a denial of the
motions for rehearing."' 7 3 The newly announced rule was quickly applied by
the Third District Court of Appeal in Gaines v. Russo.
174
The applicable limitation period for claims of malpractice arising from
criminal defense representations also was addressed by the Supreme Court
of Florida. In Steele v. Kehoe,175 the court answered the question of whether
the defense lawyer's former client must be exonerated as a prerequisite to
176bringing a legal malpractice action against the lawyer. After reviewing
some policy considerations, the court followed the majority rule and held
that "a convicted criminal defendant must obtain appellate or post conviction
relief as a precondition to maintaining a legal malpractice action."'
'
Furthermore, the court held that the statute of limitations on the defendant's
malpractice claim did not begin to run until final appellate relief or post
conviction relief has been obtained.
178
Interestingly, the Second District Court of Appeal held that even per-
sons who are not lawyers may be held liable in a legal malpractice action.1
In Buscemi v. Intachai,80 a financial planner who held a law degree but was
not licensed to practice was sued by a former customer for giving allegedly
incorrect and damaging advice concerning the client's legal affairs.181 The
defendant asserted that, as a non-lawyer, he could not be held liable for
171. 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175-76 (Fla. 1998).
172. Id. at 1175-76.
173. Id at 1175 n.2.
174. 723 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
175. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (May 27, 1999).
176. Id. at S237. There had been some disagreement among the district courts of appeal
concerning the correct rule. Compare Rowe v. Schreiber, 725 So. 2d 1245, 1250 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (stating "we agree with those courts that have required criminal defendants to
obtain post conviction relief or to set aside their convictions on appeal before pursuing an action
for legal malpractice against their defense attorneys"), with Martin v. Pafford, 583 So. 2d 736,
738 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding defendant "was not required to have succeeded in
obtaining collateral relief from her criminal conviction before she could civilly sue her attorney
for malpractice").
177. Steele, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S238.
178. Id.
179. Buscemi v. Intachai, 730 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
180. 730 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
181. Id. at 330.
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failing to give the proper legal advice. 182 Disagreeing, the appellate court
stated, "[a]ppellant overlooks the fact that whether a lawyer or not, if he
undertakes to give legal advice, he is subject to a standard of due care. '8 3
Fees, of course, are an essential aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.
The importance of being aware of and complying with the relevant rules of
ethics was highlighted in several cases decided over the past year. The
Florida. Bar v. Carson 84 concerned a lawyer who complained to the Florida
bar about the alleged failure of another lawyer to pay him a referral fee in a
personal injury case. .185  Upon investigation, it was determined that the
alleged agreement to pay a referral fee had not been reduced to writing and
that the lawyer had accepted other referral fees in the absence of written
agreements. This conduct was contrary to the relevant ethics rules, which
require any division of fee between lawyers not in the same firm to be
pursuant to a written agreement, signed by the participating lawyers and the
client, disclosing how the fee will be divided and providing that each
participating lawyer will accept joint legal responsibility for the case.187 The
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 737 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1999).
185. Id. at 1069.
186. Id. at 1071.
187. Subdivision (g) of RPC 4-1.5, 'TEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(1), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer, or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the
representation and agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(3) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be
made and the basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
Id. Additional rules that apply to fee divisions in contingent fee personal injury-type cases are
set forth in subdivision (t(4)(D) of RPC 4-1.5, which provides:
(f) Contingent Fees. As to contingent fees:
(4) A lawyer who enters into an arrangement for, charges, or collects
any fee in an action or claim for personal injury or for property damages or
for death or loss of services resulting from personal injuries based upon
tortious con-duct of another, including products liability claims, whereby the
compensa-tion is to be dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the
successful prosecution or settlement thereof shall do so only under the
following requirements:
1999]
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bar then turned the tables on the lawyer by instituting disciplinary
proceedings against him.18s  The lawyer was found guilty and ordered to
attend a practice and professionalism enhancement program.
In addition to presenting possible disciplinary problems,' 1 in 1995 the
Supreme Court of Florida clearly stated in Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis
19 1
that a fee agreement that does not comply with applicable ethics rules may
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee
within subdivision (f)(4) shall be on the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the
legal services on behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the
legal services on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any
fee in excess of 25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in
which 2 or more lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active
participation in the providing of legal services. In such circumstances counsel
shall apply to the court in which the matter would be filed, if litigation is
necessary, or if such court will not accept jurisdiction for the fee division, the
circuit court wherein the cause of action arose, for authorization of the fee
division in excess of 25%, based upon a sworn petition signed by all counsel
that shall disclose in detail those services to be performed. The application for
authorization of such a contract may be filed as a separate proceeding before suit
or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint. Proceedings thereon may occur
before service of process on any party and this aspect of the file may be sealed.
Authorization of such contract shall not bar subsequent inquiry as to whether the
fee actually claimed or charged is clearly excessive. An application under this
subdivision shall contain a certificate showing service on the client and The
Florida Bar. Counsel may proceed with representation of the client pending
court approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be
applicable after deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained
especially for appellate purposes.
Id.
188. Carson, 737 So. 2d at 1070.
189. Id. In 1994 the Supreme Court of Florida approved the creation of the practice and
professionalism enhancement program (sometimes known as "ethics school") "as an alternative to
existing sanctions," in order to "provide educational opportunities to members of the Bar for
enhancing skills and avoiding misconduct allegations." Florida Bar Re Amendments to Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282,283 (Fla. 1994).
190. See The Florida Bar v. Rubin, 709 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1998) (disciplining lawyer for
suing another lawyer on alleged verbal referral fee agreement, which did not comply with ethics
rules).
191. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995). "[W]e hold that a contingent fee contract entered into
by a member of The Florida Bar must comply with the rule governing contingent fees in order to
be enforceable." Id. at 185-86.
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be unenforceable. 192 Despite this significant statement from the supreme
court, more than one court has seemingly ignored the Chandris decision in
circumstances that call for its application. Eakin v. United Technology
Corp.193 is one such case.194 Former counsel for the plaintiff in a personal
injury action attempted to enforce their contingent fee agreement through a
charging lien.' 95 The plaintiff defended by contending that lawyers were not
entitled to a fee because the settlement proceeds from which the fee was to
be paid had never been distributed (the defendant had refused to pay the
agreed-upon settlement amount until there had been a resolution of various
liens asserted against the settlement).196 Theplaintiff also challenged the
underlying validity of the fee agreement.1 Plaintiff alleged that the
agreement violated The Florida Bar ethics rules thus was unenforceable. 198
Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that the agreement provided that the two
lawyers would divide the fee in a manner that would violate RPC 4-
1.5(f)(4)(D) (governing division of contingent fee between counsel in
personal injury matters). 199 Without even mentioning Chandris, the court
rejected Plaintiff's claim.200 The court purported to base its decision on
language in the RPC's Preamble, which states that the RPC are "not
designed to be a basis for civil liability."20' The court's rationale failed to
192. Id.
193. 998 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Fla 1998).
194. lId at 1422. Another such case is Miller v. Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., 699 So. 2d 729
(Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997) (in suit by law firm against its former employee to enforce
provision of employment agreement that allegedly violated RPC 4-5.6(a), which prohibits
agreements restricting a lawyer's right to practice after termination of the employment
relationship, the court's decision failed to even mention Chandris in rejecting former employee's
argument that agreement was unenforceable as against public policy because it violated RPC 4-
5.6(a)).
195. Eakin, 998 F. Supp. at 1424.
196. Id. at 1425.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1428.
199. Id. See supra note 187.
200. Eakin, 998 F. Supp. at 1429.
201. Id. (emphasis omitted). The court quoted the following paragraph from the "Scope"
section of the Preamble to the RPC:
Violation of a rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The rules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be
a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be
subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons.
The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does
not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has
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recognize that, even though the RPC themselves are not standards governing
civil actions, agreements providing for violation of an ethical rule can
nevertheless be so contrary to public policy that the agreement is considered
void and unenforceable-as the Supreme Court of Florida expressly held in
Chandris. 2
Several cases of interest dealt with various aspects of contingent fees.
The definition of a "contingent fee" was addressed in Worobec v. Morse.
2
0
3
The lawyer and client entered into a fee agreement in two matters, collection
of promissory notes and partition. 204 Their agreement provided that the
money recovered in the partition action would be used to pay for all hours
worked by the lawyer in both cases, but that the lawyer would receive
nothing if nothing was recovered in the partition case.20 The appellate court
held that arrangement did not create a contingent fee in the promissory note
collection matter, because the fee was not contingent on outcome of that
(promissory note) case, and thus the contingent fee risk multiplier did not
apply2
The right of a lawyer who withdraws from a contingent fee
representation prior to occurrence of the contingency was discussed in
Calley v. Thomas M. Woodruff, P.A.20 The lawyer was hired to handle a
personal injury claim on a contingent fee basis, but withdrew prior to
conclusion of the case. 208 The client hired a new lawyer, who settled the
case.2°9 The original lawyer filed a charging lien and ultimately was
awarded fees by the trial court. 210 The general rule in Florida is that an
attorney who withdraws from a contingent fee case before the contingency
occurs forfeits all right to compensation, unless the withdrawal was
standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Accordingly, nothing in the rules
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the
extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such duty.
Id.
202. Chandris, 668 So. 2d at 186.
203. 722 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). Regarding the definition of
"contingent fee," see also Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc., 669 So. 2d 1162, 1167 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (defining contingent case as "one where payment depends on winning and
collecting"); Quanstrom v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 519 So. 2d 1135, 1136 n. I (Fla. 5th Dist. CL
App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990) ("controlling substantive
character of a contingency fee agreement is the feature that the attorney gets paid in one event and
not in another.").
204. Morse, 722 So. 2d at 227.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 227-28.
207. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1999 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1998).
208. Id. at D1999.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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necessitated by the client's demand for illegal or unethical conduct by the
lawyer.211 The trial court in Calley awarded fees based on its finding that the
lawyer had withdrawn as a result of a "well-founded belief" that the client
would perjure himself at trial.212 The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the fee award, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court's finding that the unethical conduct exception to the
general rule applied. 21 The lawyer had
made no attempt to inquire to confirm his suspicion that [the
client] intended to offer false testimony, nor did he take any
action to dissuade [the client] from offering false testimony.
In the absence of compelling evidence to show that the
client's conduct is criminal or fraudulent, a lawyer cannot
have a reasonable belief the client will lie without at least
214inquiring of the client.
Enforcement of a lawyer's claimed right to a fee, whether contingent or
non-contingent cases, typically generates litigation. This past year was no
exception. One of the most common and efficient means of enforcing a right
211. Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
212. Cal/ey, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1999.
213. Id.
214. IML at D1999-2000. Calley is also instructive regarding a lawyer's duty under RPC
4-3.3 when faced with a client who intends to offer false evidence or engage in a fraud on the
court. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-3.3, "CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL,"
provides:
(a) False Evidence; Duty to Disclose. A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer
testimony or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may
not offer testimony that the lawyer knows to be false in the form of a narrative
unless so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evidence
and thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
(b) Extent of Lawyer's Duties. The duties stated in subdivision (a)
continue beyond the conclusion of the proceeding and apply even if
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule 4-
1.6.
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to a fee is through the mechanism of a lawyer's charging lien.211 In Feldman
v. New Alliance Insurance Co.,2 6 a lawyer represented a client in a breach of
contract action against the client's insurer. Suit was filed just two weeks
after the subject auto accident occurred. 218  Not long thereafter the client
discharged the lawyer, who filed a charging lien for fees allegedly due
him." 9 The client settled the case with a new lawyer. 22  Neither the client
nor the insurer paid the fees claimed by the original lawyer, and the trial
court denied his motion for fees on the ground that the suit was filed
"prematurely" and did not help the client's case.221 The Third District Court
of Appeal reversed.222 The lawyer provided some legal services to the client
and established his charging lien for those services.23 Accordingly, the
matter was remanded for determination of the amount due the lawyer. 4
A high-profile case in which a charging lien was at issue was State v.
American Tobacco Co. This case centered around a dispute over
attorney's fees arising from the multi-billion dollar settlement in Florida's
litigation against the tobacco industry.226 A group o~rivate law firms had
contracted to represent the State in the litigation. A very favorable
settlement was reached with some of the defendants. The lawyers filed acharging lien on the date that the settlement agreement was approved by the
215. One of two common law liens available to lawyers in Florida, a "charging lien is [an]
equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in [the] suit secured to him in
[the] judgment or recovery in that particular suit." Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum &
Zaverik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983). The other equitable lien is called
a retaining lien, which is a possessory lien, asserted as security for payment of accrued but unpaid
fees or costs, that a lawyer has on papers, funds, and other property of his or her client that comes
into the lawyer's possession in the course of the lawyer's professional employment. See, e.g.,
Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1986); Wintter v. Fabber, 618 So. 2d 375
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Dowda & Fields, P.A. v. Cobb, 452 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984). Unlike a charging lien, which is case-specific, a lawyer may assert a retaining lien
over property relating to one case that he or she is handling for a client in order to secure the fee
owed by that client to the lawyer from another case. Mones, 486 So. 2d at 561.
216. 722 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
217. Id. at 939.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Feldman, 722 So. 2d at 939.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 723 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1998).
226. Id. at 264.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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court.229 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, millions of dollars were
deposited in an escrow account.2 30 The trial court, however, quashed the
charIng lien on the ground that the underlying fee contract was unenforce-
able. This order was subsequently reversed by the Fourth District Court
232of Appeal. On remand, the lawyers moved to enforce their charging lien,
and the State filed a writ of prohibition in the supreme court to prevent the
trial court from ordering disbursement of any funds to the lawyers.2 33 The
supreme court relied on the fee contract between the parties in reaching its
decision. a The contract specified that, when the settlement agreement
became final, all monies were to be distributed to the State.235 The lawyers'
right to their fees "ripens upon the payments being made pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement and those payments being transmitted to the State.
236
Accordingly, the court held that no charging lien could be imposed upon the
funds because such a lien "would be contrary to the contract for legal
services entered into" between the lawyers and the State.
237
The scope of an attorney's retaining lien was addressed in Boroff v. Bic
Corp.23 8  A lawyer represented the plaintiffs in a personal injury suit,
advancing costs and expenses of about $20,000 on his clients' behalf.239 The
defendant prevailed in the suit and obtained a costs judgment against the
lawyer's clients. 240 In a separate personal injury suit for the same clients, the
lawyer secured a recovery and had $4500 placed in his trust account.24 1
When the defendant in the first suit sought to garnish the lawyer's trust
account, the lawyer asserted a retaining lien for the costs owed from the first
suit and the fees owed from the second suit.242 The trial court recognized the
retaining lien, but permitted it to attach only to the fees owed to the lawyer
from the second suit. 43 The appellate court held that the lien should extend
to both fees and costs: "an attorney's retaining lien attaches to all property
229. Id. at 266.
230. American Tobacco Co., 723 So. 2d at 266.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 268.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. American Tobacco Co., 723 So. 2d at 268.
236. Id. at 267-69.
237. Id. at 268.
238. 718 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
239. Id. at 349.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Boroff, 718 So. 2d at 349.
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of the client that comes into the attorney's possession, to secure payment of
all debts-including fees and costs-owed by the client to the attorney."
244
An interesting fee-related issue was raised in Dadic v. Schneider.245 A
couple sued their former lawyer and his law firm for malpractice. 246 Among
the allegations was a count allegin legal malpractice through the charging
of excessive fees by the lawyer.24 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed a summary judgment for the lawyer, stating that "[n]o authority
supports a cause of action on this theory.""
Termination of the lawyer-client relationship can also raise ethical
issues. RPC 4-1.16249 sets forth the standards governing termination of a
244. Id.
245. 722 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
246. Id. at 922.
247. Id. at 923.
248. Ma
249. RPC 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION,"
provides:
(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as
stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct or law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) When Withdrawal Is Allowed. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or
if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's
services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client falls substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that
the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) Compliance With Order of Tribunal. When ordered to do so by a
tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause
for terminating the representation.
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representation.250 One of the most basic principles in this area is that a
lawyer must withdraw (or attempt to withdraw) from the representation
when discharged by the client.251 Apparently, however, some lawyers do not
always understand or adhere to this basic principle. In Florida Bar v.
Vining,a52  lawyer was disciplined for several rules violations, including the
failure to comply with RPC 4-1.16 2 3 by withdrawing from representation
after his client discharged him. 4 The lawyer was representing the client in
connection with a certain building controlled by the client and in which the
lawyer happened to be a tenant.25 The lawyer represented the client in suing
another tenant. 6 While an appeal of the trial court's decision in that case
was pending, the client discharged the lawyer and four days later, sued the
lawyer's professional association for unpaid rent. Refusing to take no for
an answer, the lawyer continued to represent the client in the appeal-and
even participated in oral argument. The client complained to the Florida
Bar, which ultimately led to the lawyer's suspension from the practice of law
for six months.259 The supreme court noted that "Rule 4-1.16 requires a
lawyer to withdraw from representation if 
the lawyer is discharged.",ui
Application of the termination of representation rules in the criminal
context creates special concerns, however, particularly in view of the
constitutional obligation of the state to provide legal representation to
defendants who cannot afford to hire a lawyer.2 1 The Supreme Court of
Florida previously ruled that a trial court must grant a public defender's
motion to withdraw from a representation when the public defender certifies
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not
been earned. The lawyer may retain papers and other property relating to or
belonging to the client to the extent permitted by law.
Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 721 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1998).
253. Id. at 1166. Specifically, the lawyer violated subdivision (a)(3) of RPC 4-1.16. See
supra note 249.
254. Vining, 721 So. 2d at 1164.
255. Id. at 1165.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1167.
258. Id. at 1168.
259. Vining, 721 So. 2d at 1170.
260. Id. at 1168.
261. U.S. CONsT., amend. VI.
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to the court that the interests of one client are so adverse or hostile to those
of another client that the public defender cannot represent the two clients
without a conflict of interest.262 The trial court has no discretion in this
situation; it is not permitted to reweigh the underlying facts and substitute its
conclusion for that of the public defender. 63 Despite this clear pronounce-
ment from the supreme court, in at least six reported cases, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed trial court orders denying public
defenders' motions to withdraw due to certified conflicts. 264 In one of these
265cases, Reardon v. State, the appellate court appeared to invite the
legislature to change the result of the supreme court's controlling decision.
2 6
A trial court's order denying court-appointed criminal defense counsel's
motion to withdraw was affirmed on appeal in Thomas v. State.267 Counsel
moved to withdraw on eve of trial, stating that his law firm previously
employed the mother of one of the witnesses and previously represented
members of that witness's family in an unrelated civil case. The trial
court denied the lawyer's motion to withdraw.269 The defendant was
convicted, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.2 The appellate court
distinguished between conflicts of interest involving current or former
clients of a criminal defense lawyer and conflicts arising from the lawyer's
personal interests: l
The conflict in this case did not involve representation of
clients or former clients with competing interest. Rather the
conflict arose from a personal relationship not shown to
involve substantial emotional ties. In these circumstances,
prejudice is not presumed and the defendant must
262. Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994).
263. Id. at 998-99.
264. See Ross v. State, 730 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Terry v. State, 24
Fla. L. Weekly D406 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Sheffield v. State, 725 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999); Leslie v. State, 720 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Reardon v. State,
715 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Filan v. State, 720 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).
265. 715 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that it was "bound to follow
Guzman," the court stated that "[a]ny change in which a public defender's certification of conflict
is treated by the trial courts and reviewed will have to come from the legislature").
266. Id. at 348.
267. 725 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
268. Id. at 1172-73.
269. Id. at 1173.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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demonstrate that he has been prejudiced in some way to
establish reversible error.
272
A case of interest involving a "nonwithdrawal" was Milane v. State.273
On appeal of his criminal conviction, the defendant asserted that the trial
court had erred by not replacing his public defender with private counsel.
274
Apparently, the defendant was concerned because another lawyer in the
public defender's office was representing, in another case, a person who was
a material witness against the defendant in his case.275 The public defender
had refused to certify conflict on these facts. 27 In affirming the conviction,
the appellate court noted that there was no indication that defense counsel's
cross-examination of the witness "was anything other than vigorous" and
that the defendant had failed to establish the existence of a conflict that
adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 2" While the court may have
correctly affirmed the conviction as a matter of law, it appears that the
defense counsel's apparent non-recognition of any conflict may have been an
incorrect application of the ethics rules.27 A lawyer's cross-examination of
a current client is considered a confli&t of interest.279 This conflict ordinarily
would extend to all lawyers within the law firmn pursuant to RPC 4-
1.10(a). 
0
Finally, lawyers who have the good fortune to be elevated to a position
on the bench should take care to close out their practices in an orderly,
responsible fashion as contemplated by RPC 4-1.16. 2 A lawyer who
allegedly "virtually abandoned her law practice and neglected several client
matters during the time she ran for office as a county court judge" was found
guilty of violating a number of RPC and disciplined by the Supreme Court of
Florida. 2
272. Thomas, 725 So. 2d at 1173.
273. 716 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
274. ld. at 837.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Milane, 716 So. 2d at 837.
279. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-
367 (1992).
280. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.10, "IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION;
GENERAL RULE," provides: "(a) Imputed Disqualification of All Lawyers in Firm.
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when
any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by rule 4-1.7, 4-1.8(c), 4-
1.9, or 4-2.2." Id.
281. See supra note 249.
282. In re Hapner, 718 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla. 1998). Among the rules violated were RPC
4-1.1 (competence), 4-1.3 (diligence), 4-1.4 (communicating with clients), 4-1.5(e)
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III. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A lawyer's relationship with the system of justice is a more abstract, yet
critically important one. How does one have a relationship with a "system?"
In a practical sense, how are one's responsibilities to and within a "system"
determined and measured? For the lawyer, the answers to these questions
are probably best arrived at by considering their relationships with and
responsibilities to the two principal constituencies of the justice system,
judges and the public whom the system is designed to serve. Cases in 1999
addressed relevant issues such as the disqualification of a lawyer or law firm
from a litigated matter, the question of a lawyer's dual role as advocate and
witness, a lawyer's ability to comment publicly on matters in which he or
she is participating, the lawyer's obligation of candor owed to the court, the
conduct of lawyers during a trial, a lawyer's professionalism obligations, and
the question of proper argument to the jury.
Disqualification of a lawyer based on the fact that he had previously
represented the opposing party was addressed in Eplee v. Eplee.28 3 The
lawyer was representing the husband in a divorce action. 4 Sixteen years
earlier, while representing the same client in a criminal matter, the lawyer
had given legal advice to the client's girlfriend (who was now the wife in
this divorce action) concerning her possible claim of spousal immunity.2
The trial court granted the wife's motion disqualifying the lawyer based on a
finding that the prior advice to her created an attorney-client relationship.2
6
On petition for writ of certiorari the First District Court of Appeal quashed
the order of disqualification, concluding that there had been no assertion that
the lawyer had obtained any confidential information from the wife and no
showing that the prior legal advice was substantially related to the current287
case.
(communicating basis or rate of fee to client), 4-1.6(d) (confidential information), 4-3.3 (candor
toward a tribunal), and 4-8.4 (misconduct). Id. at 787.
283. 722 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1998).
284. Id. at 277-78.
285. Id. at 278.
286. Id.
287. Id. As a general rule, when a lawyer represents a new client whose interests are
materially adverse to those of his or her former client, a conflict of interest exists if either the two
matters are the same or substantially related or the lawyer possesses confidential information that
could be used to the disadvantage of the former client. RPC 4-1.9, supra note 80. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Harris Ins., Inc., 572 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1991).
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The imputed disqualification 288 of lawyers or law firms was addressed
in several cases. Russakoff v. State289 concerned an order disqualifying a law
firm. The law firm had represented a Health Maintenance Organization
("IMO") that subsequently went into receivership and was taken over by the
state's Department of Insurance.290 The Department sought to recover
certain funds from the HMO's former chief executive officer and sole
shareholder, who then hired the law firm to defend him.291 The trial court
granted the Department's motion to disqualify the law firm, "finding that the
law firm had represented [the HMO] in a related matter, and that, moreover,
the Department would certainly call as witnesses the lawyers who had
advised [the HMO] regarding this matter."292 The appellate court quashed
the order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
293
The court discussed the issues of conflicts resulting from the firm's
former representation of the HMO and from the possibility that firm lawyers
would testify as witnesses.294  Significantly, the court indicated that
screening of certain lawyers might prevent the law firm from being
disqualified under the former client conflict rule, RPC 4-1.9,295 stating that:
[t]he fact that there was an attorney-client relationship
between [the HMO] and [the law firm] would automatically
disqualify those individual lawyers from working on matters
that they handled or were directly related to matters that they
handled. Other lawyers in the firm, however, would be
disqualified only if any [law firm] lawyer would be called at
trial, or if confidences would be exchanged that would
disadvantage the [DepartmentJ.296
288. "Imputed disqualification" is the principle under which the conflict or
disqualification of one lawyer is deemed to apply to all lawyers practicing together in the
conflicted lawyer's firm. RPC 4-1.10(a) (1993).
289. 724 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
290. Id. at 583.
291. Id.
292. L
293. Id. at 585.
294. Russakoff, 724 So. 2d at 584-85.
295. Supra note 80.
296. Russakoff, 724 So. 2d at 584 (emphasis added). Regarding the issue of
disqualification due to the lawyers' testimony, the opinion correctly recognized that the mere fact
that a lawyer in the firm would testify as a witness would not automatically disqualify the entire
firm, but that any testimony of a firm lawyer that would involve confidential information would
create a disqualifying conflict for entire firm. Id. at 583. See RPC 4-3.7(b), infra note 338 and
accompanying text.
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The opinion's apparent support for the concept of screening to prevent
disqualification of a private law firm297 is unique in Florida. Decisions of
other Florida state and federal courts have declined to permit this practice,
which is not recognized in the RPC.
298
The principle of imputed disqualification becomes more difficult to
apply when lawyers move between law firms. The relatively simple rule of
"one lawyer's conflict is every lawyer's conflict" that ordinarily applies to
all lawyers practicing together in an organization299 is modified somewhat
when lawyers move between employers.300 School Board of Broward
County v. Polera Building Corp.301 concerned a lawyer who had worked on
some matters relating to his law firm's representation of a school board in
various cases.3 2 The lawyer then changed employers; he moved to another
law firm that represented a plaintiff in a suit against the school board.3°3 The
school board moved to disqualify the lawyer's new firm.3 4 Unfortunately
297. Screening is effective to avoid disqualifying conflicts of interest when lawyers move
from government employment to private practice, or vice versa. RPC 4-1.11 (1993).
298. See In re Outdoor Products Corp., 183 B.R. 645 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Birdsall v.
Crowngap, Ltd., 575 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Petrin, 516 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). RPC 4-1.10 contains no provision for
screening.
299. See subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.10, supra note 280.
300. Subdivisions (b) and (c) of RPC 4-1.10, "IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION;
GENERAL RULE," provide:
(b) Former Clients of Newly Associated Lawyer. When a lawyer becomes
associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the
same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with
which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose
interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) that is material to
the matter.
(c) Representing Interests Adverse to Clients of Formerly Associated
Lawyer. When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm
is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests
materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated
lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by rules
4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
Id.
301. 722 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
302. Id. at 972.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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for the lawyer, the new firm reacted by terminating his employment. 30 5 The
trial court denied the motion to disqualify the new firm, based on affidavits
submitted by the parties.306  On petition for writ of certiorari, the court
quashed the order of disqualification because the trial court erred in basing
its decision on affidavits rather than holding an evidentiary hearing.? A
hearing is needed because the imposition of imputed disqualification in a
situation involving lawyers who change employment in the private firm
setting depends in large part on the factual issue of possession of
confidential information. The Polera court concluded that RPC 4-1.10(c)
30 1
applies when a law firm responds to a motion to disqualify by terminating
the employment of its lawyer who is alleged to have a conflict.3 9 It then
specified that the trial court must make the factual determinations of whether
the lawyer with the alleged conflict had any confidential information and
whether the new firm gained any confidential information from that lawyer
before he was fired from the firm; a hearing is required for these
determinations.
310
The need for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling
on a disqualification motion was also recognized in Boca Investors Group,
Inc. v. Potash.31 1 The appellate court reversed an order of disqualification,
noting that the nature of the lawyer's meeting with the purported former
312client was unresolved. This case is also noteworthy because, at least for
disqualification purposes, the court recognized the distinction between an
initial consultation regarding counsel's availability, which would not require
305. Id.
306. Polera Bldg. Corp., 722 So. 2d at 972.
307. Id. at 973. The court relied on Nissan Motor Corp. USA v. Orozco, 595 So. 2d 240
(Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1992).
308. See supra note 300.
309. Polera Bldg. Corp., 722 So. 2d at 973. The court relied on the Nissan case in
reaching this conclusion. Id. It would appear, however, that Nissan reached the wrong result. If,
in the type of factual scenario presented in both cases, the new law firm had not fired the
allegedly conflicted lawyer, the firm would have been governed by the more stringent rule
expressed in RPC 4-1.10(a), rather than the relatively lenient standard of RPC 4-1.19(c). It seems
inappropriate to allow the law firm to benefit by firing a lawyer that it knew or should have
known presented a potential conflict problem when hired. This type of conflict avoidance
strategy typically does not work with respect to current client conflicts. A lawyer or law firm
usually is not permitted to turn a current client into a "former" client through withdrawal and then
claim that it no longer has a conflict problem. See, e.g., Florida Ins. Guaranty Ass'n Inc. v. Carey
Canada, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See also Hilton v. Barnett Banks, Inc., No. 94-
1036-CIV-T-24(A), 1994 WL 776971, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1994).
310. Pokra Bldg. Corp., 722 So. 2d at 973. These two issues track the requirements of
RPC 4-1.10(c). l
311. 728 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
312. Id.
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disqualification, and a discussion that included disclosure of confidential
information, which would result in the creation of a lawyer-client
relationship and thus require disqualification.3 3
A conflict arising from a lawyer's personal interest can also form the
basis of a motion to disqualify counsel. Lee v. Gadasa Corp.314 concerned
315mortgage foreclosure litigation that began in 1987. In 1997, a motion was
filed to disqualify defense counsel from the case.3 16 The motion was based
on defense counsel's 1988 action to secure his fee by taking a junior
mortgage on the property that was the subject matter of the foreclosure
litigation. The movant alleged that the lawyer's conduct violated RPC 4-
1.8(i)317 and created a disqualifying conflict of interest. The trial court
granted the motion, but its order was reversed by the First District Court of
318Appeal. The appellate court stated that "the trial court may well have
319been justified in concluding that [the lawyer] had violated" RPC 4-1.8(i).
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the lawyer's "actions may merit
investigation by the Florida Bar," it concluded that disqualification was not
appropriate. 320 The lawyer's client had expressly waived any conflict of
interest3P2 1 and, perhaps most significantly, the movant had waited several
years after learning of the mortgage before filing the motion to disqualify.a2
313. Id.
314. 714 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
315. Id. at 611.
316. Id.
317. Subdivision (i) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(i) Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Cause of Action. A lawyer shall not
acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses;
and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee.
Id.
318. Lee, 714 So. 2d at 612.
319. Id. This issue is one that has been quite controversial and generated a variety of
opinions by the authorities that have considered it. See, e.g., Rubel v. Brimacombe & Schlecte,
P.C., 86 B.R. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Burk v. Burzynski, 672 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1983); Arizona
State Bar Op. 86-11; Connecticut Bar Association Informal Op. 97-4; Georgia State Bar Op. 86-
7; Maine Board of Bar Overseers Op. 97; New Mexico Op. 1986-7; North Carolina State Bar Op.
186; Texas State Bar Op. 449; Virginia State Bar Op. LEO 1653; Bar Association of Nassau
County (N.Y.) 86-3.
320. Lee, 714 So. 2d at 612.
321. The court's opinion did not discuss the fact that RPC 4-1.8(i) contains no provision
for client waiver or consent. Compare subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.8, supra note 131.
322. Lee, 714 So. 2d at 612.
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This delay led the appellate court to conclude that the movant had "waived
any right it mi'ght have otherwise had to seek [the lawyer's]
disqualification.
' '2-
Lawyers must be aware that the non-lawyers they employ can create
disqualification risks. An important case in this area was Koulisis v.
Rivers.324 A secretary working on a case for the defendant's law firn had
access to confidential and privileged information in the firm's files, attended
meetings at which the case was discussed, spoke with the client during
pendency of the suit, and so forth.325 During the litigation, the secretary left
the defense firm and began working for the plaintiff's firm. The plaintiffs
firm completely screened the secretary from the case.326 The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to disqualify the plaintiff's firm, concluding
that the firm had taken sufficient steps "to insure that there [was] no
impropriety. 327 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, applying the
same conflict rule that would apply if a lawyer had switched sides-Rule 4-
1.10(b). 328 In refusing to recognize any distinction between lawyers and
non-lawyers in this type of situation, the court went further than any of the
other Florida authorities that have addressed this issue.329
The court flatly stated that "[the secretary]'s desertion was akin to a
lawyer switching to an opposing firm in the middle of a lawsuit." 330  The
court noted that the secretary had access to confidential information while
employed by the defense firm and that she then began to work for the law
firm on the other side of same suit. In the court's opinion, nothing more was
required to support the disqualification of the hiring firm.331 The screening
procedures employed by the hiring firm did not save it from disqualification;
screening of lawyers is not recognized by RPC 4-1.10(b) and so was not
323. Id. Other Florida cases have reached similar conclusions concerning delay as
waiver. See, e.g., Concerned Parents of Jordan Park v. Housing Auth., 934 F. Supp. 406 (M.D.
Fla. 1996); Transmark, U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 631 So. 2d 1112 (Flalst Dist. Ct. App.); Balda v.
Sorchych, 616 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1993); Birdsall v. Crowngap, Ltd., 575 So. 2d
231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
324. 730 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
325. Id. at 291.
326. Id.
327. lL
328. Id. at 293.
329. See City of Apopka v. All Comers, Inc., 701 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App.
1997); Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1988); Lackow v.
Walter E. Heller & Co., 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1985); Florida Bar Professional
Ethics Committee Op. 86-5 (1986). See also Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Buenaagua, 685
So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1996); Tuazon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 641 So. 2d 417
(Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1994).
330. Koulisis, 730 So. 2d at 291.
331. Id. at 292.
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available to the non-lawyer employee under the view taken by the court.
Furthermore, the court rejected the idea that an evidentiary showing of unfair
advantage was necessary because it simply applied RPC 4-1.10(b), unlike
other cases that have required such a showing before ordering
332disqualification as a result of a non-lawyer's move between law firms.
An interesting aspect of the issue of non-lawyers and disqualification
from litigation was brought out in Caridi v. Inorganic Recycling Corp.333 A
corporation hired a person who used to be a lawyer, who was no longer
admitted to the bar of any state, to perform a "legal audit" of the
corporation.334 At the time, the corporation's principals believed that the
person was licensed to practice law and had given him information that
could be considered privileged under Florida law.335 Later, a dispute arose
among the corporation's principals. One side's counsel hired the ex-lawyer
to assist in the litigation. Consequently, that counsel was disqualified
because his client reasonably believed that he was a lawyer, and because of
the access to confidential information regarding the opposing side that was
enjoyed by the ex-lawyer as a result of his performance of the legal audit.
336
The RPC3 37 recognize that it may be unethical for a lawyer to act as
both advocate and witness for a client in a matter.338 Violation of RPC 4-3.7
332. See All Comers, 701 So. 2d at 642; Esquire Care, Inc., 532 So. 2d at 740. The
Koulisis court certified conflict with these cases. 730 So. 2d at 293.
333. 715 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
334. Id. at 1072.
335. The Florida attorney-client privilege is codified in FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1997).
336. Caridi, 715 So. 2d at 1073.
337. Regarding the underlying rationale of RPC 4-3.7, see Scott v. State, 717 So. 2d 908
(Fla. 1998); Mansur v. Drage, 484 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
338. RPC 4-3.7, "LAWYER AS WITNESS," provides:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client
except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is
no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to
the testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.
(b) Other Members of Law Firm as Witnesses. A lawyer may act as
advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be
called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9
[concerning conflicts of interest].
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can lead to disqualification from litigation for the lawyer 39 and, in some
situations, the lawyer's firm.340 In Singer Island, Ltd. v. Budget
Construction Co.,341 the appellate court upheld a trial court's denial of a
motion to disqualify. The court emphasized the seriousness of
disqualification and its view that motions to disqualify based on allegations
that a party's lawyer will also be a witness should be regarded "with some
skepticism, because they sometimes are filed for tactical or harassing
reasons, rather than the proper reason, [RPC] 4-37.342 Courts have
disqualified lawyers and law firms on the ground of improper
communications with represented persons. 343 In this case, the trial court
correctly denied the motion to disqualify because, at the time the motion was
filed, the movant had alleged "only a possibility that disqualification might
be necessary," rather than waiting to file the motion after developing more of
a record to support the allegations that the subject lawyer would testify as a
witness.
344
Although disqualification motions are often interposed due to alleged
conflicts of interest, other ethical transgressions may form the basis of such
motions. In Pinebrook Towne House Associations, v. C.E. O'Dell &
Associates, Inc.,s45 an engineer met with a company's lawyers concerning the
company's potential claims against him. When litigation ensued, the
engineer retained a lawyer who asserted that disqualification was warranted
due to this allegedly improper communication.346 The trial court granted the
engineer's motion to disqualify the lawyers but on review the Second
District Court of Appeal quashed the order.347 The engineer knew that the
339. See, e.g., Larkin v. Pirthauer, 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997);
Fleitman v. McPherson, 691 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL. App. 1997).
340. See, e.g., Springtree Country Club Plaza, Ltd. v. Blaut, 642 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist.
CL App. 1994).
341. 714 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1998).
342. Ud at 652.
343. See, e.g., Rentclub v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla.
1992). See also Inorganic Coatings Inc. v. Falberg, 926 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Cronin v. Nevada
Dist. Court, 720 P.2d 1150 (Nev. 1989). In the instant case, the allegedly improper
communications were with an unrepresented person.
344. Singer Island, 714 So. 2d at 652.
345. 725 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
346. The movant apparently urged disqualification based on RPC 4-1.7, the general
conflict of interest rule, supra note 120, but the crux of the allegations seemed to concern the
communication issue rather than any conflict allegations. Perhaps the movants focused on this
language in the Comment to RPC 4-1.7 that states: "[w]here the conflict is such as clearly to call
in question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the
question." RPC 4-1.7 comment (1993).
347. Pinebrook Towne House Ass'ns, 725 So. 2d at 433-34.
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lawyers represented the opposing party, no documents provided to the
attorneys were confidential, and it was "undisputed that [the engineer] was
aware that these attorneys represented" the company, meaning that there was
no violation of RPC 4-4.3.348 The appellate court refused the engineer's
invitation to "craft a rule, similar to Miranda warnings, which would require
putting a potential defendant in a civil case on notice that anything he says
will be used against him."
349
A final case of interest in the disqualification arena dealt with the
authorization of an out-of-state lawyer to appear in a Florida court pro hac
vice.35 0  In Srour v. Srour,35 1 the out-of-state lawyer was admitted as co-
counsel with a Florida law firm. The opposing party moved to disqualify the
lawyer on the grounds of alleged failure to comply with section 2.060(b) of
the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration.s3 2 The district court withdrew
its grant of pro hac vice admittance not on this ground, however, but because
348. Id. RPC 4-4.3, "DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSONS," provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
Id. Courts have disqualified lawyers and law firms on the ground of improper
communications with represented persons. See e.g., Rentclub v. Transamerican Rental Fin.
Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992); see also Inorganic Coatings, Inc. v. Falberg, 926 F.
Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Cronin v. Nevada Dist. Court, 720 P.2d 1150 (Nev. 1989). In the instant
case, the allegedly improper communications were with an unrepresented person. Pinebrook
TowneHouseAss'ns, 725 So. 2d at 433.
349. Pinebrook Towne House Ass'ns., 725 So. 2d at 433.
350. BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 1212 (6th ed. 1999) defines "pro hac vice" as: "For this
turn; for this one particular occasion. For example, an out-of-state lawyer may be admitted to
practice in a local jurisdiction for a particular case only." Id.
351. 733 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
352. Subdivision (b) of FLA. R. JuD. ADMN. 2.060 provides:
(b) Foreign Attorneys. Attorneys of other states shall not engage in a
general practice in Florida unless they are members of The Florida Bar in
good standing. Upon verified motion filed with a court showing that an
attorney is an active member in good standing of the bar of another state,
attorneys of other states may be permitted to appear in particular cases in a
Florida court. A motion for permission to appear shall be submitted with or
before the attorney's initial personal appearance, paper, motion, or pleading.
The motion shall state all jurisdictions in which the attorney is an active
member in good standing of the bar and shall state the number of cases in
which the attorney has filed a motion for permission to appear in Florida in
the preceding three years.
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the lawyer was a family member of one of the litigants.5 3 The appellate
court ruled that this decision was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
"Although there is considerable discretion of the trial court in reference to
admitting lawyers to pro hac vice practice, the decision should not be
arbitrary. There is no prohibition against a lawyer representing himself, let
alone a family member.
354
As officers of the court, lawyers have an obligation not to impair the
fairness of proceedings in which they are involved by making prejudicial
extra judicial statements. 355 This duty is embodied in RPC 4-3.6, which
precludes a lawyer from making a public, out-of-court statement that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know "will have a substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. 356  Of course,
restrictions on a lawyer's right to speak publicly must be carefully
scrutinized in light of the First Amendment. 357 The United States Supreme
Court has held that the standard expressed in RPC 4-3.6 permissibly
balances the lawyer's free speech rights and the state's interest in providing
fair trials.Y A trial court that imposes restrictions or "gag orders" on
lawyers' rights to publicly comment on pending proceedings should do so
only after finding that such action is necessary to ensure a fair trial, and
narrowly tailoring the prohibition to bar only those statements that are
substantially likely to materially prejudice the trial.359  The court in
Rodriguez v. Feinstein360 did not make such findings to support its protective
order restricting the extra judicial statements of lawyers in a medical
malpractice case, and the order was quashed by the appellate court.
353. Srour, 733 So. 2d at 593.
354. Id.
355. RPC4-3.6 (1993).
356. RPC 4-3.6, 'TRIAL PUBLICITY," provides:
(a) Prejudicial Extrajudicial Statements Prohibited. A lawyer shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding due to its creation of an imminent and
substantial detrimental effect on that proceeding.
(b) Statements of Third Parties. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist
another person to make such a statement. Counsel shall exercise reasonable
care to prevent investigators, employees, or other persons assisting in or
associated with a case from making extrajudicial statements that are
prohibited under this rule.
Id.
357. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
358. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
359. Rodriguez v. Feinstein, 734 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
360. Id.
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A lawyer owes strict duties of candor toward the court before which he
or she practices, and is also obligated not to engage in misconduct that
would affect the outcome of the proceedings. Making false representations
to a court is one of the most serious professional offenses that a lawyer can
361 362commit. In Florida Bar v. Klausner, a lawyer who engaged in such
conduct was suspended from the practice of law for three years.363 In its
opinion, the supreme court indicated that, but for the referee's
recommendation of a suspension rather than disbarment, the lawyer would
have been disbarred.3 4
Lying to a court can also result in civil sanctions. A lawyer, found
guilty of such misconduct, was ordered to pay the attorney's fees that the
opposing party incurred due to the lawyer's failure to appear at a scheduled
deposition in Lathe v. Florida Select Citrus, Inc.365 In trying to excuse his
conduct, the lawyer falsely stated to the court that he had been ordered to
appear before another judge at the time in question. The lawyer then sought
a writ of certiorari to quash the court's prior order requiring him to pay the
opposing party's legal fees. Denying the writ, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal stated that "[i]t takes chutzpah to admit to lying to a court and yet
still seek review of an order imposing sanctions."
366
The courts condemed other forms of misrepresentation during the past
year. In Leyva v. Samess,367 an auto accident case, the plaintiffs' lawyer
violated an order in limine by referring to a defendant by his title of
"doctor."368 Plaintiffs' brief on appeal contained what the appellate court
characterized as "a gross misrepresentation" of the order in limine.3 69 The
court went on to issue this admonition to other lawyers who might appear
before it: "Attorneys should be aware that in this court's preparation for
determining cases on the merits, the record on appeal is thoroughly
reviewed. We cannot help but notice attorneys' distortions of the record in
their briefs. Such misrepresentations diminish the force and effect of the
argument made. 37°
361. See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Rightmyer, 616 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1993); The Florida Bar
v. Dodd, 118 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1960).
362. 721 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1998).
363. Id. at 722.
364. Id. (Pariente, J., concurring with Wells, J., dissent urging disbarment).
365. 721 So. 2d 1247, 1247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
366. Id.
367. 732 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
368. Id. at 1120.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1121.
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Another case in which a party's argument on appeal was criticized for a
lack of candor was Builder's Square, Inc. v. Shaw.371 The appellant's
counsel presented a number of contentions, some of which the court
described with terms such as "specious" and "disingenuous. 372  In an
attempt to reinforce the need for professionalism among lawyers, the court
sternly warned:
The fact that [appellant] has some legitimate issues to be
presented to this court does not give it license to add
specious ones. Nor does it give it the right to distort facts
and erroneously present a judge's statement. Perhaps the
only way to eliminate such issues is to refuse to respond to
all issues presented by the party at fault. The Appellant's
attorney, who appeared before the trial court, has an
otherwise well-respected reputation. We are hesitant to
single him out because he is not alone in presenting the
problems we have present. We do, however, remind all
counsel that they have a duty to the Bar and their profession,
as well as to their clients. We must begin to reevaluate how
many "bites of an apple" we, as an appellate court, are
willing to recognize, and we will not hesitate in the future to
sanction those that engage in the conduct this court has
faced in this cause.
In Rampart Life Associates, Inc. v. Turkish,374 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal again had the opportunity (or misfortune) to address misconduct
on the part of appellate counsel. The appellant appealed a non-final order
denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 376 While the
case was on appeal, appellant's lawyer moved to supplement the record with
a deposition taken after entry of the order being appealed. 377 The appellate
court denied the motion.378 Despite this, the lawyer included in her brief
information from the subject deposition (the information was placed in a
footnote). 379  The court struck the offending footnote and imposed a
371. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D653 (4th Dist. CL App. Mar. 10, 1999).
372. Iad at D653.
373. Id at D654.
374. 730 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
375. Id. at 385.
376. Id. at 384.
377. Id. at 385.
378. Id.
379. Turkish, 730 So. 2d at 385.
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monetary sanction on the lawyer, stating that her action had violated two
ethical rules, 8 0 RPC 4-3.5(a), and RPC 4-3.4(c).382
Lawyers are not the only professionals who have ethical obligations inthe coutroom.Sparks383• ,• .
the courtroom. Sparks v. State concerned a judge's duty to maintain
impartiality. 384 During a bench conference in a criminal case, the judge
pointed out the fact that the defendant had completed an affidavit of
indigence containing information that might have conflicted with his trial
testimony.385 The prosecutor then cross-examined the defendant, using the
386information the judge alluded. The affidavit was introduced into evidence
387over a non-specific objection of defense counsel. Thus, the issue of the
partiality of the trial judge was raised for the first time on appeal. The
appeals court ruled that this issue constituted fundamental error that could
38838not be considered harmless. 8 The conviction was reversed.389
Tampering with witnesses is considered serious misconduct on the part
of a lawyer, and is prohibited by RPC 4-34(b). 9° The United States
380. Id.
381. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-3.5, "IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE
TRIBUNAL," provides: "(a) Influencing Decision Maker. A lawyer shall not seek to
influence a judge, juror, prospective juror, or other decision maker except as permitted by law
or the rules of court." Id.
382. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-3.4, "FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND
COUNSEL," provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists."
Id.
383. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D829 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999).
384. Id. at D829.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Sparks, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D830.
389. Id. A dissenting opinion agreed with the majority that it is improper for a trial judge
to assume the role of advocate, but disagreed that the judge had crossed that line in this case.
Rather, the dissenting justice viewed the trial judge's conduct as a reasonable exercise of
judgment in addressing a case of perjury that arose during the trial. Id. at D831 (Padovano, J.,
dissenting).
390. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-3.4, "FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND
COUNSEL," provides:
A lawyer shall not:
(b) fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness, except a lawyer may pay a witness reasonable
expenses incurred by the witness in attending or testifying at proceedings; a
reasonable, noncontingent fee for professional services of an expert witness;
and reasonable compensation to reimburse a witness for the loss of compen-
sation incurred by reason of preparing for, attending, or testifying at proceed-
ings.
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an interesting application of
this rule in United States v. Lowery.391 The defendants in separate criminal
cases moved to suppress testimony of their alleged co-conspirators that had
been obtained by the prosecution as a result of plea bargains. 92 They argued
that the plea agreements violated federal law against bribing witnesses393and
Florida ethics rule RPC 4-3.4(b),394 which prohibits a lawyer (in this case
the government prosecutor) from "offer[ing] an inducement to a witness.
'
051
Based on the reasoning in United States v. Singleton396 concerning the legal
issue and on the language of RPC 4-3.4(b) concerning the ethical issue, the
trial court granted the motion to suppress. 398
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Regarding the RPC 4-
3.4(b) question, the court noted that "[it is far from clear that Rule 4-3.4 9_
prohibits conduct leading to the type of agreements at issue in this case."
The court, however, did not decide the case on that ground. Rather, it ruled
that "a state rule of professional conduct cannot provide an adequate basis
for a federal court to suppress evidence that is otherwise admissible."
400
A civil case involving conduct that the appellate court described as
"witness tampering" was Jost v. Ahmad.4° A treating physician, who was a
testifying witness for the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case, was
contacted on the day he testified by the defendant hospital's insurance
carrier.402 Allegations were made that the contact was made with the
knowledge of defense counsel.4°3 The trial court declined to permit the
plaintiff's lawyer to investigate the matter and bring the existence of this
contact before the jury.404 This ruling was error, and the appellate court
reversed the jury's verdict for the defense and remanded the case for a new
trial.4
5
Id. (emphasis added).
391. 166 F.3d 1119 (11thCir. 1999).
392. Id. at 1119.
393. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994).
394. RPC 4-3.4(b) (1993).
395. ld.
396. 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), reviewed en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
397. Lowery, 166 F.3d at 1121.
398. Id. at 1125.
399. Id. at 1124.
400. Id.
401. 730 So. 2d 708,710 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
402. Id. at 709.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 710.
405. Id. at 711.
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Other types of trial conduct involving lawyers were criticized in
reported decisions. In Harley v. Lopez,4°6 a lawyer represented personal
injury claimants who sued a county and lost at both trial and on appeal.
40
7
The county's motion for appellate fees and costs was denied by the trial
,, 408court for "failure to present expert testimony. The claimants' lawyer
objected to the county's expert affidavits for the first time at fees/costs
hearing.4Q 9 The county's motion for a continuance to allow it to produce its
expert was denied.410 Reversing the award, the Third District Court of
Appeal stated that "we believe that affirming the trial court's denial of
appellate fees in this instance would reward [the lawyer]'s 'gotcha' tactics,
tactics long abhorred by this court. 411
In Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc. ,42 a lawyer who filed a
meritless motion for rehearing, which ap Peared to be filed "solely as a tool
to express his personal displeasure" with the court's per curiam
affirmance, was deemed to have violated Rule 9.330(a) of the Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure.414 The court denied rehearing, then referred the
lawyer to the Florida Bar by directing the court clerk to provide the Bar with
a copy of the court's opinion.415 Additionally, the court ordered the lawyer
416to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. After considering
the lawyer's response, the court imposed a monetary sanction of $2500.
4 17
A lawyer's motion to disqualify a judge can also create ethical
concerns. The Second District Court of Appeal expressed its displeasure
about the contents of certain motions in J & J Industries, Inc. v. Carpet
Showcase of Tampa Bay, Inc. 41  The court served notice that it expectscandor and ethical behavior on the part of lawyers who file such motions:
While it is not our role in reaching a decision-nor has it
been in this instance-to pass on the truth of the various
allegations counsel for [petitioner] has pleaded, we point out
406. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D878 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1999).
407. Id. at D878.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Harley, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D878.
412. 716 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1998).
413. Id. at 876.
414. Id.
415. The court stated that it was referring the lawyer to the Bar "pursuant to the
mandatory language contained in 5-H Corp. v. Padovano." Id. at 877 (internal citation omitted).
416. Id.
417. Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc., 718 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
418. 723 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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this misleading and ethically suspicious excerpt from its
motion in the hope that counsel's reliance on disingenuous
accusations during proceedings to disqualify trial judges-
themselves largely insulated from inspection of their
reliability-will not always be shielded from public
scrutiny. 
19
Similarly, lawyers who behave inappropriately toward each other in the
context of litigation may suffer criticism from the bench. In Baitty v.
Weaver,420 a lawyer appealed an order directing her to pay fees and costs of
more than $76,000 to opposing counsel.421 The order was premised on the
trial court's finding that the lawyer misrepresented the truth to a Florida
court.4 The appellate court reversex. "he order, concluding that the record
did not support this finding.4 3 In dissenting, one justice added a "personal
observation" to the effect that lawyers s.ould think very carefully before
engaging in bitter litigation such as this based on alleged misstatements of
other lawyers.424 He noted that, while judges should not take lightly a
finding that a lawyer has lied to a court, "the image of lawyers calling one
another liars raises its own set of problems."
425
In the criminal defense arena, a criminal prosecutor's conduct was
considered questionable enough to warrant a referral to the Florida Bar for
investigation. 426 In Lewis v. State,427 the prosecution withheld material that
should have been turned over to defense counsel pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland.42s Noting that the trial court made no findings concerning
whether the failure to turn over the material was intentional or unintentional,
thi appeals court pointed out that an intentional withholding would violate
RPC 4-3.8(c), 429 which concerns the ethical duties of prosecutors, and turned
the matter over to the Florida Bar. 3°
419. Il at 284.
420. 734 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 585.
424. Id. at 586.
425. Baitty, 734 So. 2d at 586 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
426. Lewis v. State, 714 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
427. Id. at 1202.
428. 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963).
429. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-3.8, "SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A
PROSECUTOR," provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(c) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
"mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
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Another prosecutor's conduct was criticized in Dunstall v. State.431 A
defendant's conviction of sexual battery was reversed and remanded for a
new trial as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. 432 A certain writing was
referred to by defense counsel, and the state objected.433 At the ensuing
bench conference, defense counsel stated that he did not intend to try to
introduce the writing itself into evidence.434 The court ruled the writing
inadmissible. 435 Despite this ruling, the prosecuting attorney asked a witness
to produce the writing and, "incredibly enough, then proceeded to object
when the witness complied. 436  Based on this objection, the trial court
"erroneously struck the exculpatory testimony of the witness."437  A
concurring opinion termed the prosecutor's actions "unprofessional" and
commented that "she followed neither her oath of office438 nor the ideals and
goals of professionalism 439 of the Florida Bar."440
Every year numerous cases are decided on improper argument, and this
year presents a dizzying array, which ranges from reversal, despite a failure
to contemporaneously object and preserve the issue for appeal, to a "bright
line" decision, never to reverse without proper preservation of the issue at
trial. Although courts frequently find argument to be improper under the
RPC,44' courts have been reluctant to reverse a case without preservation of
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to
the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by
a protective order of the tribunal.
Id.
430. Lewis, 714 So. 2d at 1203. The conviction was not reversed because the information
that was withheld "did not have the probability of changing the outcome of [the] trial." Id.
431. 730 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
432. Id. at 822.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Dunstall, 730 So. 2d at 822.
437. Id.
438. Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, 72 FLA. B.J. 781 (Sept. 1998).
439. Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, 72 FLA. B.J. 779-80. (Sept. 1998).
440. Dunstall, 730 So. 2d at 823 (Thompson, J., concurring).
441. Most frequently, courts find a violation of RPC 4-3.4(e), "FAIRNESS TO
OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL," which provides that:
A lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
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the record by contemporaneous objection. The courts have, however,
continued their recent trend to comment on the inappropriateness of
attorneys' comments, apparently in the hope that pointing out these errors
will deter attorneys from making them.442
Thus, the Second District Court of Appeal refused to reverse the
conviction of a defendant despite the improper argument of the prosecutor.
443
The court, however, specifically stated that "our affirmance should not be
construed as approval of the remarks made by the prosecutor."444 The court
found that the state attorney improperly "vouched for the truthfulness of the
officers, told the jury to send [the defendant] a message, argued matters not
in evidence, and commented on [the defendant's] exercise of his right to a
jury trial.""445  Judge Alternbernd, in a concurring opinion, opined that
attorneys who practice criminal law should be required to review continuing
legal educations videotapes on improper arguments.
446
The Second District Court of Appeal also affirmed a conviction while
findingz that the prosecutor made an improper closing in Henderson v.
State.447 The court found that the prosecutor's remarks improperly shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant and expressed personal opinions about
the defendant's honesty.448  The prosecutor stated in closing that the
defendant "would not know the truth if it hit him up side the head" and
stated that the jury should find the defendant not guilty if the jury
"believe[d] what [the defendant] said on the witness stand," among other
improper remarks.4
49
The Fifth District Court of Appeal took a bright line approach to
improper argument, in stating that the court will not reverse cases if the error
is not preserved by contemporaneous objection, finding that lawyers have
failed to object as a tactical weapon.450 The court concluded that comments
by a plaintiff s attorney were improper because they "request[ed] the jury to
act as the conscience of the community and accus[ed] [the defendant], his
attorney, and his witnesses of committing perjury. 4  Nevertheless, the
442. E.g., id.
443. Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. This approach to prosecutorial misconduct was reiterated in Dunsizer v. State,
1999 WL 94970, at *1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1999), in which the court found that the
prosecutor argued facts not in evidence, stating that "[a]lthough it is proper for prosecutors to
argue inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence... they have no license to
argue fiction." Id.
447. 727 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
448. Id. at 285-286.
449. Id.
450. Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
451. Id. at 1034.
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court also suggested that attorneys fail to object as a tactical weapon, hoping
to gain a verdict in their favor, while believing that the appellate courts
would reverse the case based on improper argument if not.4 2 The court
further noted that attorneys are subject to discipline by the Florida Bar for
misconduct, and that courts and other attorneys have an obligation to report
such misconduct. 453 Two judges dissented, stating that the appellate courts
had just removed themselves from the fray of curbing attorney excesses in
argument, 454 and stating that prior courts were "content to uphold the honor
of its court and the integrity of the judicial process by merely denying the
unethical lawyer the benefit of his misconduct ' 45 5 in reversing cases for
improper comments.
The Supreme Court of Florida, on the other hand, does not share the
Fifth District's "bright line" rule and has been willing to reverse cases
without contemporaneous objection. In a scathing opinion, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct in a
death penalty case, finding that the argument constituted fundamental error
in Ruiz v. State.456 The court blasted a series of improper arguments by the
prosecutors in this case, stating that "[i]t is particularly improper, even
pernicious, for the prosecutor to seek to invoke his personal status as the
government's attorney or the sanction of the government itself as a basis for
conviction of a criminal defendant. 457 The court thus found improper the
prosecutor's statements, such as "what interest do we [ ] as representatives
of the citizens of this county have in convicting somebody other than the
person''458 and "what interest is there to bamboozle anybody about [the
defendant's] real role in this case, 4 5 9 implying that "[i]f the defendant
wasn't guilty, he wouldn't be here."460 The prosecutors in this case referred
to the defendant as "Pinocchio" 46' and then stated that "[t]ruth equals• ,,462 *,,n 6iv
justice. The court found that such argument invit[es] the jury to convict
[the defendant] ... because he is a liar." If these statements were not bad
452. Id. at 1035. Another case which chided attorneys for failing to object, in the hopes
of gaining a tactical advantage, is Simmons v. Swinton, 715 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
453. Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1036.
454. See id. at 1040.
455. Id. at 1042.
456. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S157 (Apr. 1, 1999). Apparently, although the defense objected
to some of the prosecutor's remarks, it did not object to all of them. Id. at S 157.
457. Id.
458. Id. at S158.
459. Id.
460. Ruiz, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S158.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id. at S158.
[Vol. 24:199
Chinaris / Tarbert
enough, one of the prosecutors also improperly sought to appeal to the
juror's personal sympathies by mentioning her father's role in the military
during Desert Storm. In response to the State's argument that many of the
comments were not the subject of contemporaneous objection, the court
stated that "[w]hen the properly preserved comments are combined with
additional acts of prosecutorial overreaching set forth below, we find that the
integrity of the judicial process has been comromised and the resulting
convictions and sentences irreparably tainted." 465" The court then referred the
prosecutors to the Florida Bar for possible disciplinary action.4
Many of the lower courts have followed the supreme court's example in
reversing cases for improper argument without objection. In Freeman v.
State,467 the Fifth District Court of Appeal, prior to its "bright line" ruling,
reversed a conviction after the prosecutor improperly bolstered the
credibility of its police witnesses by stating that the police should be
468believed merely because they are police officers. A prosecutor's personal
attack on the defense attorney was also the basis of a reversal in D'ambrosio
v. State.469  The Third District Court of Appeal appeared particularly
incensed with the statements of a prosecutor whose improper remarks were
before the court for the third time in Izquierdo v. State.47° Continuing a
trend, the court referred the attorney to the Florida Bar for investigation after
finding that "the improprieties committed by [the prosecutor] ... are both
breathtaking in their number, variety, and gravity and perhaps unprecedented
even in our long and dreary experience with this problem."471 The court
found that he improperly called the defense a "pathetic fantasy"47 - and
464. Id. at S158. The court stated the following about these remarks:
This blatant appeal to jurors' emotions was improper for a number of reasons:
it personalized the prosecutor in the eyes of the jury and gained sympathy for
the prosecutor and her family; it contrasted the defendant (who at that point
had been convicted of murder) unfavorably with [the prosecutor]'s heroic and
dutiful father, it put before the jury new evidence highly favorable to the
prosecutor, it exempted this new evidence from admissibility requirements
and from the crucible of cross-examination; and most important, it equated
[the prosecutor]'s father's noble sacrifice for his country with the jury's moral
duty to sentence Ruiz to death.
Rui 24 Fla. L. Weekly at 5158-59.
465. Id. at 5159.
466. Id.
467. 717 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
468. Id. at 105.
469. 736 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); see also, Boyer v. State, 713 So. 2d
1133 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1998).
470. 724 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
471. Id. at 125.
472. Id.
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"improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy and emotions as, for example,
by asking it to consider the effects a crime such as this has on 'the water we
drink, the air we breathe, the ground our children play on."' 473 The court
then invited the trial court to consider dismissing the case for prosecutorial
misconduct after the reversal and remand.474
In Nigro v. Brady,475 the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that
preservation of the error by requesting a mistrial is not required in a motion
for new trial, even if the comments do not rise to the level of fundamental
error.476 The court found that the defense attorney badgered the witness by
asking questions to obtain inadmissible evidence. The court found that a
trial court has "broad discretion to set aside a jury verdict and grant a new
478trial," based on the improper comments even sua sponte. The court also
remarked on the deterrent effect such a ruling may have on attorneys who act
improperly. 479
A trial court can avoid reversal by properly admonishing a jury
regarding inappropriate remarks. Thus, the trial court who sustained an
objection for improper argument, admonished the prosecutor and gave a
curative instruction to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks was
upheld in Sinclair v. State.us  The prosecutor in closing argument
improperly indicated that a police officer should be relied on because "the
officer would not put his or her career on the line by committing perjury." 48'
The court wrote specifically to reprimand the prosecutor, stating that "[i]t ill
becomes those who represent the state in the application of its lawful
penalties to themselves ignore the precepts of their profession and their
office." 4 2 Similarly, the supreme court found no error in a matter in which
the trial court gave a curative instruction to the jury when the prosecutor
called the defendant an "amoral, vicious, cold-blooded killer.' '483  In
concurring, Justice Pariente specifically pointed out several improper
remarks of the prosecutor to "send a message to the community" in stating
that a jury recommendation for life for a deaf defendant is "an insult to all
who have achieved greatness and lived law abiding and productive lives in
473. Id. at 125-126.
474. Id. at 126.
475. 731 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
476. Id. at 54.
477. Id. at 55.
478. Id. at 56.
479. Id.
480. 717 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
481. Id. at 100.
482. Id. at 101.
483. Hawk v. State, 718 So. 2d 159, 162 (Fla. 1998).
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spite of the same handicap."484  She also stated that the prosecutor's
statements, that mitigation evidence is "pathetic excuses," were "clearly
improper."
485
Failure to handle an objection properly, however, will result in reversal,
as evidenced by the case of Barnes v. State. 4 6 The prosecutor referred to
defense counsel as a "hired gun," 4V prompting the defense attorney to ask
that the remarks be stricken; the trial court responded by telling the jury to
"[i]gnore the last comment. ' 488 The appellate court pointed out that the
instruction was "quite ambiguous" because it could be referring to the
defense attorney's request that the remarks be stricken. 489 The appellate
court also stated that the trial court should specifically reprimand the
prosecutor and give a clear curative instruction, stating that "[f]or a curative
instruction conceivably to erase the palpable prejudice to the defendant in
this situation, the court should have condemned the comment in the clearest
and most unmistakable terms.,,490 Finally, the court referred the prosecutor
to the Florida Bar for investigation of improper conduct, noting that the
prosecutor had "persisted in this improper conduct for more than five. years
in spite of repeated disapproval of it by our court. 491
Other cases involving reversal include one in which the prosecutor
improperly referred to matters not in evidence in Jones v. State.492  A
prosecutor was also reprimanded for bolstering his expert witness by
inappropriately asking if the defense attorney had attempted to hire the same
493expert in Milburn v. State. A reversal was also required where a
prosecutor attempted to introduce evidence of other crimes in violation of a
pre-trial ruling, and referred to those other crimes in closing argument.494
Based on a finding that "truth is a defense," the appellate court found
that no improper remarks had been uttered by the plaintiff's counsel who
stated that the opening statement of the defendant's attorney was "the most
unethical opening statement I have ever heard. 495 The court found that the
plaintiffs attorney had stated the truth, in finding that "[b]y calling the
484. Id. at 164.
485. Id. at 165.
486. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D458 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1999).
487. Id. at D459.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. at D459.
491. Barnes, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D458.
492. 730 So. 2d 346 (Fa 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
493. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D851 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1999), withdrawn and
superceded on other grounds, 24 Fla. Weekly D1936 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1999).
494. Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1998).
495. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. McKenna, 726 So. 2d 361,363 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
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defendant's argument 'unethical,' plaintiff's lawyer was simply defending
himself and his client's case against a barrage of blatant improprieties by his
opponent. His comment was an accurate description of defense counsel's
tirade.
, 496
IV. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THIRD PARTIES
Most of the duties owed by a lawyer are to the client, including duties
such as competence, 497  diligence,498 confidentiality, 499 and loyalty.:5
Lawyers also owe special fiduciary obligations to clients regarding their
501property. Under some circumstances, lawyers also owe fiduciary
obligations to third parties regarding funds or property? °2  Thus, the
496. Id.
497. RPC4-1.1 (1993).
498. Id. at R. 4-1.3.
499. Id. at R. 4-1.6.
500. Id. at R. 4-1.7-1.12.
501. RPC 4-1.15, the safekeeping property rule, and Chapter five on trust accounting, set
forth the obligations of a lawyer toward client funds.
502. RPC 4-1.15 "SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY," states the following:
(a) Clients' and Third Party Funds to be Held in Trust. A lawyer shall
hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, funds and property of
clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation. All funds, including advances for costs and expenses, shall be
kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is
situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person, provided
that funds may be separately held and maintained other than in a bank
account if the lawyer receives written permission from the client to do so and
provided that such written permission is received prior to maintaining the
funds other than in a separate bank account. In no event may the lawyer
commingle the client's funds with those of the lawyer or those of the lawyer's
law firm. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately
safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property,
including client funds not maintained in a separate bank account, shall be
kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of 6 years after
termination of the representation.
(b) Notice of Receipt of Trust Funds; Delivery; Accounting. Upon
receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding such property.
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(c) Disputed Ownership of Funds. When in the course of representation a
lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another
person claim interests, the property shall be treated by the lawyer as trust
property, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be
withdrawn within a reasonable time after it becomes due unless the right of
the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed, in which event the portion in
dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
(d) Compliance With Trust Accounting Rules. A lawyer shall comply with
The Florida Bar Rules Regulating Trust Accounts.
Id. RPC 4-1.15 Comment:
A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a
professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except
when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances.
All property that is the property of clients or third persons should be kept
separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if money, in 1
or more trust accounts, unless requested otherwise in writing by the client.
Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate money or
acting in similar fiduciary capacities.
Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's
fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without
paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the
fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client
into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds
should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt
resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the
funds shall be promptly distributed.
Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against
funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty
under applicable law to protect such third party claims against wrongful
interference by the client and, accordingly, may refuse to surrender the
property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to
arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party and where
appropriate the lawyer should consider the possibility of depositing the
property or funds in dispute into the registry of the applicable court so that
the matter may be adjudicated.
The obligations of a lawyer under this rule are independent of those
arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a
lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law
relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in
the transaction.
Subdivision (d) of this rule requires each lawyer to be familiar with and
comply with Rules Regulating Trust Accounts as adopted by The Florida Bar.
Money or other property entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose,
including advances for costs and expenses, is held in trust and must be
applied only to that purpose. Money and other property of clients coming
into the hands of a lawyer are not subject to counterclaim or setoff for
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Supreme Court of Florida disciplined an attorney for engaging in fraud and
misrepresentation by signing checks payable to his client and third-party
medical providers, depositing the funds into his trust account, failing to
advise the third party that he received a settlement check on its behalf, and
failing togay the third party the money owed in settlement in Florida Bar v.
Sweeney. .3  The referee found that the lawyer had received settlement
checks from an insurance company which were made out to both the client
and medical providers. 504 The attorney signed the checks, deposited them
into his trust account, and distributed the roceeds to himself, to the client,
and all but two of the medical providers. The referee specifically found
that the attorney did not intend to defraud the medical providers or Medicaid
after the attorney testified that he believed that Medicaid would pay the
providers 506 but found that the attorney had violated RPC 4-1.15(a)507 and
(b),508 4-8.4(a)509 and (c),510 and 5-1.1.*51 The supreme court agreed with the
referee's findings that the attorney violated the safekeeping property and
trust accounting rules, but additionally found that the attorney defrauded
Medicaid by failing to pay the medical providers from the settlement checks,
and suspended the attorney for ninety-one days.512
Attorneys may incur obligations, which they do not intend regarding the
rights of others, as evidenced by the case of Berger v. Silverstein, Silverstein
513& Silverstein. In Berger, the attorney represented a client in a personalinjury case on a contingent fee basis. The attorney and the client signed a
attorney's fees, and a refusal to account for and deliver over such property upon
demand shall be a conversion. This is not to preclude the retention of money or
other property upon which a lawyer has a valid lien for services or to preclude
the payment of agreed fees from the proceeds of transactions or collections.
Id.
503. 730 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1998).
504. Id. at 1270.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. RPC 4-1.15(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the
lawyer's own property, funds and property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's
possession in connection with a representation." Id.
508. RPC 4-1.15(b) states that "[u]pon receiving funds or other property in which a client
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person." Id.
509. RPC 4-8.4(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not ... violate or attempt to violates the
Rules of Professional Conduct." Id.
510. RPC 4-8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Id.
511. RPC 5-1.1 sets forth specific requirements regarding trust accounts.
512. Sweeney, 730 So. 2d at 1272.
513. 727 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
514. Id. at 313.
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letter of protection, agreeing to pay the client's physical therapist from the
recovery. 515 The attorney, after withdrawing his fees and costs from the
settlement, had insufficient funds to pay the therapist's bill.516 The physical
therapist then filed suit against the client and the attorney to recover his
fees.5 7 The trial court granted the attorney's motion foi summary judgment,
finding that the attorney's claim for fees had a higher priority than the physi-
cal therapist's claim for fees. 518 The Fourth District Court of Appeal over-
turned the trial court decision, finding that the case should not be treated as a
priority of lien case.5 19 The court found that the specific language of the
letter of protection 520 created a contract between the attorney and the physi-
cal therapist, requiring the attorney to pay the full amount owed to the physi-
cal therapist from the recovery before paying himself for fees and costs out-
standing.521 In a concurring opinion, Judge Nesbitt indicated that, although
the attorney had a charging lien for his costs and fees, "the effect of his
agreement with the therapist was to partially or wholly divest himself from
enforcing that lien."52 In light of this case, the prudent personal injury prac-
titioner who regularly issues letters of protection to medical providers and
others, should analyze the letters of protection he or she signs to ensure that
the language of the agreements does not create an unintended contractual
obligation.
An attorney owes some obligations to the opposing party, such as the
duty not to communicate with the opposing party without the consent of the
opposing party's lawyer.523 Interpretation of RPC 4-4.25M is often the subject
515. Id.
516. Id.517. Id.
518. Berger, 727 So. 2d at 313.
519. Id.
520. Id. The court quoted from the contract the specific language that the attorney would
"withhold [the necessary] sums from any settlement, judgment or verdict as [might] be necessary
to adequately protec' the physical therapist's fee. Id.
521. Berger, 727 So. 2d at 313.
522. Id. (Nesbitt, J., concurring).
523. RPC 4-4.2, infra note 524.
524. RPC 4-4.2, "COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL," provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior
consent, communicate with another's client in order to meet the requirements
of any statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on an
adverse party, in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted to
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of cases regarding attorney discipline, disqualification, and admissibility of
evidence. The meaning of RPC 4-4.2 as applied to corporate parties was
tested this year in the case of United States ex rel. Mueller v. Eckerd Corp.
5 25
The United States government and the State of Florida sued Eckerd
Corporation under the Federal False Claims Act 52 and the Florida False
Claims Act 27 on the theory that Eckerd's was not properly filling
prescriptions.52  The government sought to communicate ex parte with
pharmacists, technicians, and clerks employed by Eckerd's, stating that the
employees were non-managerial and had expressed interest in speaking with
the government. 529 The magistrate judge denied the government's motion
for ex parte interviews, from which the government appealed as to pharmacy
technicians and clerks. 3 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, upheld the magistrate's order denying the request for ex
parte contact.5 31 The court cited the comment to RPC 4-4.2, which states, in
part, that in dealing with organizations as parties, an attorney may not
communicate with an employee of the organization "whose statement may
constitute an admission on the part of the organization." 532 The court stated
that the technicians and clerks were involved in contacting health care
providers for refill information and in counting and packaging medicine.
533
In so doing, the court held that "[i]t is for the very reason stated in the
statutory description of the pharmacy technicians' duties that the statements
obtained in an ex parte interview would have a 'substantial likelihood' of
being used against the organizations in a later proceeding."5 34 The court
found that information from these employees would be used to establish the
government's claims regarding incomplete filling of prescriptions, stating
that these employees "would be precisely the employees who could verify
Eckerd's practices in regards to filling patients prescriptions."
535
A lawyer also has responsibilities to the opposing party when the
opposing party inadvertently discloses documents. In Abamar Housing &
that required by statute or contract, and a copy shall be provided to the
adverse party's attorney.
Id.
525. 35 F. Supp. 2d 896 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
526. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
527. FLA. STAT. §§ 68.01-.092 (1999).
528. Eckerd Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 899.
532. Id. at 898 (quoting RPC 4-4.2).
533. Eckerd Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
534. Id.
535. Id.
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Development, Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady Decor, Inc.,536 an attorney was
disqualified for his failure to immediately notify opposing counsel and return
documents which were inadvertently disclosed by the other side.537 The court
found that disqualification of the attorney was appropriate, stating that the
"case demonstrates the effects of the inadvertent disclosure, the plaintiffs'
recalcitrance in rectifying the disclosure, and the unfair tactical advantage
gained from such disclosure. 538  The court added, however, that
disqualification will not always result from an inadvertent disclosure ofinformation.539 If an attorney immediately notifies the person who disclosed
the information and returns the documents, the attorney will not be
disqualified, having gained no unfair advantage.540In another disqualification case, the court chose not to disqualify an
attorney after the attorney misrepresented the law on work product privilege
to opposing counsel's investigator during deposition. 41 The attorney set a
deposition of the opposing counsel's investigator, who had been listed as a• 542
witness. At the deposition, the investigator asked the attorney if he was
inquiring into information protected by the work product privilege. The
attorney answered by stating that the privilege "has been waived because
[opposing counsel] listed you on his witness list. You are correct that
typically what an investigator does is work product." 544 The trial court
disqualified the attorney and awarded fees, finding that the attorney had
violated RPC 4-4.1,-54 which prohibits making false statements of fact or law
536. 724 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
537. Id. at 573.
538. Id. at 574.
539. Id. at 574 n.2.
540. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited to Florida Ethics Opinion 93-3,
stating that the opinion dictated disclosure of the receipt and immediate return of the documents.
Interestingly, the opinion merely requires notification of receipt of the inadvertently disclosed
documents; the opinion does not require their return. A prudent practitioner, however, will return
the documents to avoid the disqualification, which is the result in this case. Fla. Bar Professional
Ethics Comm. Op. 93-3 (1994).
541. 5500 North Corp. v. Willis, 729 So. 2d 508,514 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
542. Id. at 509.
543. Id. at 510.
544. Id.
545. RPC 4-4.1, '"RUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS," provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by rule 4-1.6.
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to a third party, and that the attorney had obtained privileged information.
46
The appellate court overturned the disqualification and the award of
attorney's fees, indicating that the attorney did not gain an "unfair
advantage" necessitating disqualification, although the attorney misrepre-
sented the law to the witness; the court specifically found that no informa-
tion protected by the work product privilege had been disclosed. 547 The court
also overturned the award of attorney's fees, finding that opposing counsel
did not obtain a protective order, did not attend the deposition, and did not
instruct his own investigator on proper areas of inquiry at the deposition.
548
The court admonished both attorneys in this case regarding their lack of
professionalism in stating "the circumstances of this case present a textbook
example of lack of cooperation between opposing counsel. We would
expect more civility from Beavis and Butthead than was displayed here by
[the attorneys]."549
Beyond being admonished for a mere lack of professionalism, lawyers
have been disciplined for their conduct toward opposing counsel and judges.
In Florida Bar v. Sayler,550 the Supreme Court of Florida publicly
reprimanded an attorney who sent a threatening letter to opposing counsel.5
The letter enclosed copies of articles about the murder of another lawyer
who practiced in the same area of law as the recipient, and quoted from the
articles.552 The court found that the sole purpose of the letter was to harass
53the opposing counsel, violating RPC 4-4.4 and 4-8.4(d). In another case,
the supreme court suspended an attorney who, among other violations,
accused opposing counsel of stealing the court file.554 In the same case, the
court also found that the attorney had impugned the integrity of a judge by
546. Willis, 729 So. 2d at 510-11.
547. Id. at 513.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 514.
550. 721 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1998).
551. Id. at 1155. The Supreme Court of Florida has also disciplined an attorney for
sending an insulting letter to the opposing party in Florida Bar v. Uhrig, 666 So. 2d 887, 888
(Fla. 1996). The letter was meant to disparage the opposing party, who was a member.of a
protected class under RPC 4-8.4(d). Id.
552. Sayler, 721 So. 2d at 1153-54.
553. Id. at 1154. RPC 4-4.4 provides that "[iln representing a client, a lawyer shall not
use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person." Id. RPC 4-8.4(d) states that "[a] lawyer shall not ... engage in conduct in connection
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly,
or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against... other lawyers on
any basis." Id.
554. Florida Bar v. Nunes, 734 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1999). The court found that the attorney
had violated Rule 4-3.1, regarding filing frivolous proceedings, 4-4.4, supra note 553, and 4-
8.4(d), supra note 553.
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filing a motion which included statements indicating that the judge had made
a mistake in an order due to lack of experience and by filing a brief
indicating that opposing counsel was trying to "get away with" conduct
before a female judge that "he could not get away with from the two (2) [sic]
male judges.
', 5
The content of an attorney's communication with others is not the only
area of controversy; 1999 saw at least one case in which the method of
communication was a bone of contention in Pee v. Arnold H. Aaron, P.A.556
The Fourth District Court of Appeal overturned a trial court's order
requiring an attorney with a fax machine to accept documents faxed by the
opposing counsel.55 The attorney who was subject to the order filed for writ
of certiorari after losing his argument that he should not be required to
accept faxes from opposing counsel because "counsel constantly and
continually [sent]argumentative letters, non-emergency pleadings, and other
materials over the fax, which constantly and continuously interrupted his
working day., 55 8 The court found that, although Rule 1.080(b)(5) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permits delivery by fax, it does not require
an attorney to have a fax machine. 59 Accordingly, an attorney who does not
wish to receive documents by fax cannot be required to do so.
560
Attorneys communicate not only with the court and opposing counsel,
attorneys also communicate with the public. Attorneys' communication with
561the public, in offering legal services, is the subject of regulation as well.
Regulation of attorney advertising was subject to constitutional challenge in
the case of Mason v. Florida Bar.562 Attorney Mason filed a yellow pages
advertisement for review with the Florida Bar563 The advertisement
included the information "'AV' rated, the Highest Rating Martindale-
Hubbell National Legal Directory."5 4  The Florida Bar opined that the
advertisement did not comply with RPC 4-7.2(j), which prohibits "self-
laudatory" statements. 65 The Florida Bar further indicated that the
advertisement would comply if the attorney included a statement that
555. Nunes, 734 So. 2d at 395. RPC 4-8.2(a) states that "a lawyer shall not make a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of ajudge." Id.
556. 719 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
557. Id. at 372.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. The rules regulating attorney advertising are RPC 4-7.1 through 4-7.8.
562. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
563. Id. at 1330. Attorneys must file non-exempt advertising for review under RPC 4-7.5.
564. Id.
565. Id. RPC 4-7.20) farther proscribes "statements describing or characterizing the
quality of the lawyer's services." Id.
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Martindale-Hubbell does not rate all lawyers and that the ratings are based
on confidential interviews. 66  The attorney challenged the rule on First
Amendment grounds and on the basis that the rule is unconstitutionally567
vague. The court found that the advertisement was commercial speech,
subject to the Central Hudson 56 test, requiring that regulation by the State
569must be "narrowly drawn" and advance a substantial state interest. The
court upheld the rule on the basis that The Florida Bar had shown substantial
interest in "ensuring (1) that lawyer advertisements are not misleading, (2)
that the public has access to relevant information to assist in the comparison
and selection of attorneys, and (3) that rating services have a strong incentive
to use objective criteria." 70 The attorney argued that the public understands
the rating system or has access to information which explains the rating
process, and therefore it could not be misleading.571 The court found that
Martindale-Hubbell is directed at the legal community, and that the public
was unlikely to research the ratings system. 72 The court also found that
requiring a brief disclosure was narrowly tailored to advance the government
interest, because it allows the attorney to convey the information. 73 The
court dismissed the attorneys "void for vagueness" argument, stating that
"only an attorney could be confused by that language. 574  The court
summarized its opinion by stating that "[t]his case is a tempest in a teapot
wherein Mr. Mason challenges the sensible requirement that if an attorney
characterizes his Martindale-Hubbell rating with the words 'the Highest
Ratings' then he must explain what that means to a public generally
unfamiliar with the Martindale-Hubbell rating system.,
575
Under the RPC, lawyers also have an obligation not to bring frivolous
proceedings.576 "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
566. Mason, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1330.
567. Id.
568. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
569. Mason, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31.
570. Id. at 1331.
571. ld
572. Id.
573. Id. at 1332-33.
574. Mason, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
575. Id.
576. RPC 4-3.1 provides the following:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal or existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding,
or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
case be established.
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or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law."577 Nevertheless, "a lawyer for the
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in incarceration, may ,... so defend the proceeding as to require
that every element of the case be established."578 This obligation can lead
not only to discipline by the Florida Bar, but also to sanctions by the trial
court. Thus, the Third District Court of Appeal upheld a monetary
sanction against a woman and her attorney for filing a frivolous subpoena in
Moakley v. Smallwood580  During the course of post-dissolution
proceedings, the former wife sought to compel production of a note that was
awarded to her in the divorce by issuing subpoenas to the former husband
and his attorneys. The motion itself stated that one of the attorneys did
not possess the note, and that attorney could not quash the subpoena because
there was little notice provided prior to the deposition.5 82 The appellate
court upheld the sanctions imposed, stating that the trial court found that the
attorney "was subpoenaed on short notice, for no good reason, to attend an
evidentiary hearing fifty miles distant."'5 83
Similarly, the Third District Court of Appeal ordered an attorney to
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed based on his abuse of the
appellate process in Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc.5 4 In Banderas,
the attorney filed a motion for rehearing after the court issued a per curiam
opinion indicating that the opinion was "a travesty of justice" and a "cop-
out" and scolded the court for not writing an opinion explaining the
decision.5 85  The appellate court found the motion "frivolous and
insulting"58 6 and filed "solely as a tool to express his personal displeasure
with this Court's conclusion."5 7 Attorneys should be careful in statements
made to the court, whether oral or written, because in addition to the
Id.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. 730 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
581. Id. at 286.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 287.
584. 716 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
585. Id. at 877.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 877.
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sanctions the court can impose, the court may also refer the issue to the
Florida Bar for potential disciplinary action, as in this case.
88
An attorney's responsibilities do not come solely from the RPC. The
attorney also has a relationship with the state, which also regulates
attorneys' conduct. The State's regulation of attorney conduct was at issue
in State v. Falk. 9  Section 817.234(9) of the Florida Statutes, which
prohibits attorneys from soliciting car accident victims, was upheld against
an equal protection challenge.59 The state filed an information charging an
attorney with violating the statute, and the attorney filed a motion to dismiss
citing equal protection and free speech grounds; the motion was granted.
591
The appellate court found a rational basis for the state's distinction between
car accident victims and other accident victims, indicating that the statute
appeared in a section entitled "[F]alse and fraudulent insurance claims."
The court stated that the legislature "may have concluded that the likelihood
of insurance fraud is greater with motor vehicles accidents" because car
insurance is required by law in the State of Florida, thereby denying the
equal protection claim. The court also found that, because the information
filed by the State did not specify any particular conduct, the trial court erred
in finding that the statute violated the First Amendment, because it could not
implement the "as applied" test;594 the appellate court therefore remanded
the case to the trial court to allow the state to amend the information, and the
defendant to renew his motion to dismiss.595
Other constitutional law developments were the subject of Chiles v.
State Employees Attorneys Guild.596 The Supreme Court of Florida struck
down section 447.203(3)0) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibited
attorneys employed by the state from engaging in collective bargaining
because it was constitutionally overbroad. 59  The court held that "we
emphasize that lawyers exercising their constitutional right to bargain
collectively may not violate the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and must
give unqualified deference to the traditional duty of loyalty that a lawyer
588. Id. at 878. See also Timothy P. Chinaris & Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, 23 NOVA L.
REv. 161, 224-25 (1998) (discussing 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So. 2d 244 (1998)).
589. 724 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
590. Id. at 149. See also FLA. STAT. § 817.234(8) (1999). The chiropractic counterpart to
the statute prohibiting attorneys from soliciting car accident victims, was also upheld against First
Amendment and equal protection challenge in Barr v. State, 731 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
591. Falk, 724 So. 2d at 147.
592. Id. at 148. See also FLA. STAT. § 817.234 (1999).
593. Falk, 724 So. 2d at 148-49.
594. Id. at 148.
595. Id. at 149.
596. 734 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1999).
597. Id. at 1031.
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owes to a client. ' 98 The Supreme Court of Florida, in reaching its decision,
cited to Florida Ethics Opinion 77-15, 599 which states that mere membership
in a union is not an ethical violation
co
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE FLORIDA BAR AND THE
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
This section discusses the attorney's relationship to the Florida Bar and
the disciplinary system. Included within this section are discipline cases that
are not easily categorized within the attorney's relationship to clients, the
court and third parties. Also discussed are changes to the RPC.
One of the most egregious violations of the RPC is that of dishonesty.
Often violations involving dishonesty invoke the harshest penalties in
discipline cases. The Supreme Court of Florida ordered a ninety-one day
suspension in the case of Florida Bar v. Cibula 601 for conduct involving
dishonesty. 602 The attorney attended a hearing in his own case regardin
alimony.6 3 While under oath, the attorney testified regarding his income.
At the time he testified, he had already earned well over the amount of
income he admitted in the court proceeding, and he had overpaid his income
taxes, which the bar's expert witness testified can be used to conceal
income.605 The supreme court found that the attorney had committed a fraud
on the court and had engaged in dishonest or fraudulent conduct.W6
The court disbarred an attorney for fraudulent conduct in the case of
Florida Bar v. Vernell.co 7 The attorney was hired by a client for
representation in multiple matters, including an eminent domain case.608 The
attorney received funds from the state both prior to trial and after the verdict
in the trial for the client.6c 9 The client filed a complaint stating that the
attorney did not inform the client that he had received funds on the client's
598. Id.
599. Id. at 1036.
600. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 77-15 (1997).
601. 725 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1998).
602. Id. at 365. According to RPC 3-5.1(e), a ninety-one day suspension is particularly
severe because an attorney is required to show rehabilitation in order to be reinstated and may be
ordered to re-take the Bar exam. RPC 3-5.1(e) (1993).
603. Cibula, 725 So. 2d at 361.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 362.
606. Id. The court found that the attorney had violated RPC 4-3.3(a) and 4-8.4(c),
respectively. Id.
607. 721 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1998).
608. Id. at 706.
609. l
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behalf, and that the attorney had never discussed the issue of fees with the
client regarding any of the matters for which the attorney had been hired.
610
The attorney claimed that there was no fee agreed upon at the outset of the
attorney-client relationship because of the friendship between the two, and
that the amount of his fees in the matters exceeded the amount he received
on the client's behalf. 6 1 The referee found that, in addition to violating the
trust accounting and safekeeping property rules, the attorney had engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, all relating to the misappropriation
of the client's funds. The supreme court upheld the referee's findings of
fact and disbarred the attorney, based on his prior disciplinary history and
the egregiousness of the offense.613
An attorney remains subject to the jurisdiction of the supreme court
even while under suspension. The Supreme Court of Florida undertook a
lengthy explanation of the basis of its jurisdiction over disbarred and
suspended attorneys in Florida Bar v. Ross. 14 The court explained that Rule
3-5.1(e) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar specifically states that
attorneys are subject to discipline as members of The Florida Bar during the
period of the suspension. 6' 5 Both suspended and disbarred attorneys remain
subject to the court's contempt powers if they violate the court order
616imposing discipline. Thus, attorney Ross was disbarred for conduct
committed during the time period of his suspension from the practice of
law.617  Ross became involved in a dispute with his landlord regarding
property that was foreclosed on and purchased at a foreclosure sale.6a 8 The
landlord started proceedings to set aside the foreclosure, and filed an
affidavit stating that he did not receive notice of the sale.6 19 Ross offered to
sell the purchaser information which he claimed would rebut the affidavit
filed by the landlord. The purchaser's attorney declined to buy the
information but informed Ross that he would subpoena him for a
deposition. 681 The opposing counsel contacted Ross to tell him the date of
610. Id.
611. Id. at 707.
612. Vernell, 721 So. 2d at 706.
613. Id. at 709-10. In another case involving dishonesty, the supreme court denied
reinstatement to an attorney who was convicted of writing over 150 worthless checks during her
probation, including writing worthless checks after applying for reinstatement. Florida Bar v.
Roberts, 721 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1998).
614. 732 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1998).
615. Id. at 1040.
616. Id. at 1041.
617. Id. at 1043.
618. Id. at 1038-39.
619. Ross, 732 So. 2d at 1039 (Fla. 1998).
620. Id.
621. Id.
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his scheduled deposition and to determine what information he had.622 Ross
offered to evade service of the subpoena for the deposition, provided the
opposing counsel paid Ross several thousand dollars; the opposing counsel
declined.623 Ross eluded service of process by posting a notice at his
address, which stated that he was on vacation. 624  In light of this conduct,
the supreme court found that Ross had violated RPC 4-8.4(c), which
prohibits dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation, and disbarred him.
62 -
An attorney may also be disciplined for violating specific obligations to
the court and to the Florida Bar. Attorneys have duties during the discipline
process, and this year several cases were decided regarding those responsi-
bilities. 62 The supreme court thus suspended an attorney for not responding
to a court order to answer a subpoena duces tecum in Florida Bar v.
Kassier.627  Furthermore, the court suspended an attorney for failing to
respond to the Florida Bar regarding a complaint and for failure to appear at
her final hearing in Florida Bar v. Summers.628 Finally, the court suspended
an attorney for submitting false documentation in responding to the bar
regarding a complaint in Florida Bar v. Arango.629 A client had complained
that the attorney failed to act diligently in a representation, and the attorney
submitted a medical authorization from the client, correspondence between
the attorney and a medical provider, and notations in a log that indicated
work was being performed on the case, all of which the court found to be
false.
630
The supreme court also considered the applicability of the RPC in
computing a suspension from another state in the case of Florida Bar v.
Shinnick. 1 An attorney was suspended from practice in Minnesota for
fraudulent conduct in business transactions not related to the practice of
law.632 The suspension was indefinite, but with the ability to apply for
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Ross, 732 So. 2d at 1039 (Fla. 1998).
625. Id.
626. See Florida Bar v. Summers, 728 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1999); Florida Bar v. Kassier,
730 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1998); Florida Bar v. Arango, 720 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1998).
627. 730 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1998). The attorney was also found to have issued worthless
checks. Id.
628. 728 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1999). The complaint to which Summers did not respond
involved a federal case which was dismissed because she did not follow the trial court's orders in
a forfeiture case as an Assistant United States Attorney. Her failure to appear at her final hearing
in the disciplinary case resulted in the referee finding her guilty of all charges by The Florida Bar.
Id.
629. 720 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1998).
630. Id. at 250.
631. 731 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1999).
632. Id. at 1265.
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633reinstatement after six months. Because the attorney had begun to
practice before the suspension period had expired, the Florida Bar
prosecuted the attorney and the referee found that the respondent had
violated the RPC based on the Minnesota suspension. 634  The referee
recommended a suspension in Florida until the attorney was reinstated in
Minnesota nunc pro tunc to the date of suspension in Minnesota, which was
July 25, 1996.635The Florida Bar argued that the suspension was for longer
than ninety days, requiring proof of rehabilitation prior to reinstatement in
Florida.6 3 6 The attorney, on the other hand, contended that his suspension in
Florida was for under ninety days, because the six months in Minnesota had
expired prior to the entry of the referee's findings and recommendation.
637
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the attorney's suspension in
Minnesota was for longer than ninety days, pointing out that he had not been
reinstated in Minnesota at the time of the referee's hearing, and required
proof of rehabilitation.638
On a more positive note, the supreme court held that a Florida Bar
member who has been found not guilty of violations of the RPC cannot be
ordered to bear the bar's costs of prosecution. 639 At the final hearing, the
referee found that the attorney had not violated the Rules, but ordered that
she pay half of the costs of the bar for the disciplinary proceeding.' The
attorney appealed, arguing that the bar was not a "prevailing party" and
should therefore bear its own costs in the case.641 The supreme court agreed,
finding that:
[a] referee does not have discretion to recommend that a
respondent in a bar disciplinary proceeding pay any portion
of the Bar's costs pursuant to rule 3-7.6(o) when the referee
recommends that the respondent be found not guilty of any
of the charged offenses and recommends no discipline or
633. Id.
634. Id at 1266. RPC 3-4.6, states that a final disciplinary order in another jurisdiction
"shall be considered as conclusive proof of such misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding under
this rule." Id.
635. Shinnick, 731 So. 2d at 1266.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 1267.
638. Id.
639. Florida Bar v. Williams, 734 So. 2d 417,421 (Fla. 1999).
640. Id. at418.
641. Id.
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other sanctions, and where the Bar is otherwise not
successful in whole or in part.4 2
The court did note, however, that it was not addressing whether sanctions
could be imposed for lack of cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding.64 3
As in every year, the supreme court considered changes to the RPC.4
Many of the changes this year involved RPC 4-1.5, regarding fees. The
court amended RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(ii) and 4-1.5(f)(4)(D)(iii) to allow
approval of a contingent fee contract in excess of the contingent fee schedule
and approval of a division of fees between attorneys not in accordance with
the schedule in "the court in which the matter would be filed" or the circuit
court of competent urisdiction, in the event that the former court will not
accept jurisdiction.645 Instead of requiring that attorneys file a separate
action in circuit court, it is now possible for attorneys to have these matters
heard in the court in which the underlying litigation takes place.64  The court
also amended the Statement of Client's Rights to indicate that a client may
be obligated to pay "costs and expenses" to the opposing party.647 The court
declined to change the percentages stated in the contingent fee schedule at
the bar's request, because the bar did not indicate the rationale for the
proposed rule change.?
The supreme court also amended RPC 4-3.4,649 adding two new
subdivisions, (g) and (h), regarding threatening criminal prosecution or
disciplinary action as leverage in a civil matter.650 The supreme court
adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970.61 Contained
within the code was Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-105, which stated that "[a]
lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." When
the supreme court adopted the current RPC,653 the rules contained no
counterpart to DR 7-105. In the interim, the Professional Ethics Committee
of the Florida Bar published formal opinion 89-3, which stated that, although
642. Id. at 420.
643. Id. at 420.
644. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 718 So. 2d 1179 (Fla.
1998).
645. Id. at 1181.
646. Id.
647. Id. at 1181-82.
648. Id. at. 1180-81.
649. RPC 4-3.4 (1993).
650. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 718 So. 2d at 1182.
651. In re The Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, 235 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1970).
652. Disciplinary Rules, FLA. BJ. 65, 66 (Sept. 1970).
653. In re Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977. For the correct opinion,
see 507 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1986).
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the rules contain no express prohibition, attorneys may not "bring,
participate in bringing, or threaten to bring criminal charges against someone
solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter or if the primary purpose of
such action is harassment." 654  This rule change re-enacts the specific
prohibition previously expressed in DR 7-105. Although the Code of
Professional Conduct did not contain an express prohibition against bringing
a disciplinary action as leverage in a civil matter, the Professional Ethics
Committee of the Florida Bar issued formal opinion 94-5, which prohibits
lawyers from threatening to file a bar complaint "to obtain advantage in a
civil matter."6 55 The amendment to RPC 4-3.4 codifies this interpretation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct
VI. CONCLUSION
This past year saw continued development of the law of lawyers'
professional responsibility in Florida. It has become increasingly more
difficult for lawyers to sort out and prioritize the numerous responsibilities
to and relationships with various persons and entities. Fortunately, the
courts and the Florida Bar continue to provide guidance for the interested
attorney in the form of cases, ethics opinions, and rules changes. In the final
analysis, lawyers must not only avail themselves of these resources but must
also draw upon themselves to realize that commitment to their clients,
dedication to our system of justice, and service to the public are the
hallmarks of our honored profession.
654. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 89-3 (1989). In maing its decision,
the committee relied on Rule 4-3.1 of the RPC, which prohibits frivolous actions, 4-4.4, which
prohibits actions with "no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third
person," 4-8.4(c) which prohibits dishonest or deceitful conduct, and 4-8.4(d) which states that an
attorney shall not "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice." Id.
655. Fla. Bar Comu. on Professional Ethics, Op. 94-5 (1995). The committee used the
same rationale as in opinion 89-3, supra, note 654. In addition, the committee noted that
attorneys have an obligation to report attorneys who have violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct "that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness
as a lawyer" under Rule 4-8.3 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.
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